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I.

JUDICIAL POWER AND POLITICAL POWER

The current focus of American constitutional law on the dramatic
issues of civil rights and civil liberties 1 has concentrated public attention
on results-the upholding of the public accommodations section of the
Civil Rights Act, the invalidation of the Connecticut anti-birth control
statute, the outlawing of Bible reading in the public schools, the
requirement of "one person, one vote." However, important as the
results in these cases are in shaping the nature of American society,
popular concentration on outcome has served to obscure the less obtrusive but equally important questions of judicial methodology--of the
function of courts in the governmental process-which underlie these
decisions, and which may, in the long run, prove equally essential to
the future development of the nation.
The vital role that the federal courts, and particularly the Supreme
Court, play in the governmental process is easily forgotten. Although
it is no longer doubted that courts make law, it is still difficult to
t Department of Government and Law, Lafayette College, Easton, Pennsylvania.
1

E.g., Griswold v. ConnectkiLt, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); United States v. Brown,
381 U.S. 437 (1965); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965); Katzenbach v. McClung,
379 U.S. 294 (1964) ; Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241
(1964) ; Apttieker v. Secretary, 378 U.S. 500 (1964) ; Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S.
478 (1964); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533
(1964) ; Griffin v. School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964) ;. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254 (1964); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964); Abington School
Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) ; Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963);
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) ; Baker "v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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comprehend that the law making authority of judges is a legitimate and
significant part of the political power of government. Judicial law
making is "undemocratic"; it represents government by a handful of
men, appointed for life, and sheltered, although not entirely, from the
pressures of public demand. It is haphazard and unsystematic, for it is
contingent upon the presentation of an appropriate case raising the
appropriate questions of constitutional or legal interpretation. It is,
in Mr. Justice Holmes' phrase, "confined from molar to molecular
motions," 2 by the stubborn fact that, for all the points of convergence,
law is not the same as other aspects of politics. Thus a court cannot
simply set out to establish justice or to create the good society but
rather must heed the peculiarly legal requirements of stability, consistency, adherence to precedent and adherence to the language of the
statutes or constitutional provisions that come before it. Nevertheless,
despite these limitations and despite the fact that its political functions
are distinct from and considerably narrower than those of the executive
and legislative branches, the judiciary remains a part of the policy
making sphere of government with unique and inescapable responsibilities of its own. Its task is to insure that the legal system is always
directed toward coincidence with the society's best conceptions of
justice, to legitimate governmental power when the public interest demands the exercise of that power, and to protect constitutional rights
against needless incursions by government or, in some cases, individuals. Accordingly the federal government's postwar policy of active
protection of civil rights was given its impetus by the judiciary, because
the Court's position of semi-isolation from politics gave it the freedom
that the political branches did not possess to begin the equation of law
and justice.
The possession of political authority, however, is quite clearly unsettling for members of the Supreme Court, who are as well aware of
their fallibility as they are of the finality of their judgments. Consequently they are particularly sensitive to charges of result orientationwhich is by no means thought to be exclusively the layman's approach
to constitutional law. Often they have sought to insulate themselves
from such charges by invoking either of two doctrines of constitutional
adjudication that purportedly treat results as entirely irrelevant to the
decision making process: the doctrine of judicial self-restraint, most
closely associated with the late Mr. Justice Frankfurter; and that of
constitutional absolutism, whose principal and most outspoken proponent has been Mr. Justice Black.3
2 Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 221 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
3 The central concept of judicial self-restraint was given its classic statement by
James Bradley Thayer, who in 1893 declared that a court was bound to defer to the
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A strong defense may be made for either of these doctrines as
the beginning of an approach to constitutional jurisprudence. The
danger is that in its zeal to avoid the exercise of political power, the
Court will convert either of these salutary attitudes into a hard and fast
rule, under which decisions would be made on the basis of preconceived
formulas by a tribunal which had deliberately blinded itself to social
realities so that they could not influence its judgments. The alternative-and, it would appear, the only alternative that reasonably can
be expected to lead to an enlightened constitutional jurisprudence-is
that judges overcome their sometimes almost pathological distrust of
themselves and recognize that they do have a legitimate political function to perform. This function can only be successfully carried out
if the Court consciously strives to inform itself as fully as possible of
the factual setting of each case and the social consequences likely to
flow from each decision.
II. COURTS, FACTS AND THE CONSTITUTION
The examination of existing factual reality is a task for courts
as well as legislatures. Certain objections, however, are traditionally
raised to judicial consideration of facts. These objections are based
on either or both of two assumptions-that courts cannot, or else
should not, venture deeply into this area.
They cannot, it is sometimes said, because "the factual determinations involved are enormously difficult and time-consuming, and
quite unsuitable for the judicial process." ' Yet making factual determinations has always been an integral part of judicial decision making.
In those cases in which the law is settled beyond dispute, the courts
judgment of the legislature on constitutional questions except "when those who have
the right to make laws have not merely made a mistake, but have made a very clear
one,-so clear that it is not open to rational question." Thayer, The Origin and
Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARv. L. REv. 129, 144
(1894). If taken literally, of course, which none of the advocates of self-restraint
has ever done, this doctrine would require the practical abandonment of judicial
review, for it is hardly likely that presumably rational legislators would ever make a
mistake on a constitutional question that would be "so clear that it is not open to
rational question."

See C. L. BLAcK, THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT 193-215 (1960).

Constitutional absolutism, although commonly considered to be a doctrine of judicial
activism because the frequent result of its application is the invalidation of legislation,
may lay claim, when carried to its logical extreme, to being even more restrained
than self-restraint. The central concept of absolutism is unswerving judicial obedience
to the commands of the Constitution. When legislation violates a constitutional provision, the judge has no choice but to declare the law unconstitutional despite any
other considerations which might militate in its favor. On the other hand, when the
legislation infringes no express constitutional prohibition, the judge must uphold it
despite all evidence that it creates pernicious social effects without serving any real
social purpose. See the opinions of Mr. Justice Black, dissenting, in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 507 (1965); El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497, 517 (1965).
4 Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendiment, 72 YALE L.J.
877, 913 (1963).
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must determine whether, as a matter of fact, the actions of the parties
fall within the scope of the law; and such a determination cannot be
avoided because it would be "enormously difficult and time-consuming."
However, there is a recognized distinction between the determination
of such adjudicative facts, which deal with particular circumstances,
relating the actions of the parties to the law, and legislative facts, which
deal with general problems and demonstrate a need for legislation;
while consideration of the former is normally conceded to be within
the province of the judiciary, consideration of the latter is usually said
to be the task of the legislature. But,.as Professor Paul Freund has
noted, this distinction, "like most categorizations, will have to give a
little at the seams." ' To the extent that the legislature, in most instances quite properly, specifies the particular acts that are to be
proscribed or required in order to carry out the general policy, it is
making decisions of an adjudicative nature. Similarly, when courts
examine the public need underlying a piece of legislation or attempt
to discern the policy which it embodies, they are considering legislative
facts, again in most instances quite properly.
Conscious consideration of legislative facts is often nothing less
than essential to the proper accomplishment of judicial tasks. In cases
involving questions of statutory interpretation, courts should understand
the nature of the evil that the legislature was seeking to correct and
the manner in which it was seeking to correct it.' Furthermore, to the
extent that the legislature employs vague language in its enactments,
achievement of the public purpose would seem to require judicial
familiarity with legislative facts.7
However, it is in the. area of constitutional interpretation that
the difficulties involved in judicial consideration of legislative facts
are considered to be insuperable by those who support reliance on
mechanistic formulas for decision making. For example, Professor
Charles Reich, in a vigorous defense of Mr. Justice Black's absolutist
position on the Bill of Rights, asks the typical question: "[I] s this a
task which judges are qualified to undertake? Courts have no sources
- Freund, Review of Facts in Constitutional Cases, in SUPREME COURT AND SUed. 1954).
and the Sources of Law, in HARvARD LEGAL ESSAYS 213-46
(1934). Professor Landis argued that courts should not only apply statutes in those
situations directly covered by their terms, but should reason from them by analogy
to establish law in related areas, in the same way that judicial precedents are employed
to control cases that, are analogous, but not identical. Clearly courts which attempt
to cooperate with the legislature in this way must be fully cognizant of the social
reasons underlying the enactments in question.
7 See Frank, Words and Music: Some Remarks on Statutory Interpretation,47
CoLum. L. REv. 1259, 1265-67 (1947). See also Frankfurter, Some Reflections -on
the Reading of Statutes, 47 CoLum. L. REv. 527 (1947) ; Landis,
A Note on "Statutory Interpretation," 43 HARv. L. REv. 886 (1930); Radin, ° Statutory Interpretation,
43 HARv. L. REv. 863, 882-85 (1930).
PREME LAw 47, 48 (Cahn
0 See Landis, Statutes
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of information other than the records before them, and judges have
no special knowledge to assist them in evaluating information of a
social and political nature if they were able to obtain it." 8 Professor
Reich promptly goes on to suggest that this inadequacy is not limited
to the judiciary, asking doubtfully whether an accurate evaluation of
factual reality, social needs, and competing interests is "an undertaking
which is capable of being performed by anyone, however expert." 9
The implications of this position are clear-human beings, no matter
how wise or expert, are fallible; knowledge and factual data, no matter
how carefully acquired, are incomplete, and therefore, since the accurate
evaluation of social and political information requires omniscience and
prescience, the task is beyond the capacity of mortal men, be they
judges, scholars, or experts, and ought not to be attempted by them.
Presumably, even legislators have no business attempting to legislate.
Thus, judges should not attempt "to resolve these conflicts by the
exercise of judgment," "0but should, instead, adopt a frame of reference
entirely independent of subjective considerations; in Mr. Justice Black's
and Professor Reich's case, "that frame of reference should be the
words of the Constitution itself." "1
Even if one concedes the fallibility of the judiciary and the inevitable incompleteness of information, there is still something more
than a trifle dissatisfying about the proposition that men ought not to
exercise judgment, ought not to do the best they can to resolve human
conflicts on the basis of the best information they can gather but ought
rather to recognize their fallibility, eschew their judgment, and render
decisions on the basis of fixed rules and formulas hopefully, but not
necessarily, applicable to the situation at hand. The Constitution obviously provides the primary frame of reference in constitutional litigatibn, but as Professor Alexander Bickel replied to Professor Reich in
a somewhat different context: "I would find myself most uncomfortable
. living under a document which in matters by hypothesis of
fundamental importance governs me without recourse, saving only
the improbability of a ridiculous amendment procedure. I would feel
terribly uncomfortable living in a society . . . in which a document
governs conduct beyond the possibility of the exercise of contemporary
human judgment."

12

SReich, Mr. Justice Black and the Living Constitution, 76 HARv. L. REv. 673,

740 (1963) ; see Emerson, supra note 4 at 913.
9
Reich, supra note 8, at 740.
'OId.at 737..
11
Id.at 744.
12 Arthur'Garfield Hays Conference: The Proper Role. of the United States
Supreme Court in Civil Liberties Cases, 10 WAYNE L. REy. 457, 475 (1964)..-
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The denial of the propriety of judicial judgment, however, is more
closely related to the second of the two assumptions noted above-that
courts, in constitutional cases at least, should, regardless of the feasibility, refrain from considering legislative facts. This assumption
grows out of the doctrine of separation of powers. The function of
a court in a constitutional case, the argument goes, is to decide the
constitutionality of a statute, not to question the legislature's judgment
as to the need for it or to attempt to discover whether its social effects
are desirable. It is this position which the proponents of judicial selfrestraint advocate. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter asserted in the second
flag salute case: "If the function of this Court is to be essentially no
different from that of a legislature, if the considerations governing
constitutional construction are to be substantially those that underlie
legislation, then indeed judges should not have life tenure and they
should be made directly responsible to the electorate." 18 Mr. Justice
Black has arrived at the same conclusion, although for reasons altogether different from Mr. Justice Frankfurter's deference to the
legislature. "I most certainly cannot agree," he has declared, "that
constitutional law is simply a matter of what the Justices of this Court
decide is not harmful for the country, and therefore is 'reasonable.' "14
Mr. Justice Frankfurter often declined to look at facts the more easily
to uphold legislation; Mr. Justice Black often has declined the more
easily to be able to strike it down. Thus the defenders of judicial
self-restraint and constitutional absolutism unite on this common
ground: the common ground of mechanical jurisprudence. For, at
bottom, either position requires acceptance of the theory that constitutional questions can be decided by merely holding the words of the
statute up against the applicable constitutional provision, and deciding
on that basis alone whether the statute is permissible.'
It was the
prevalence of this belief in mechanical jurisprudence at the start of the
century that led Dean Roscoe Pound to criticize judicial willingness
to invalidate welfare legislation as an abridgment of "liberty of contract" despite underlying social need, and to decry "the sharp line between law and fact in our legal system which requires constitutionality,
as a legal question, to be tried by artificial criteria of general application
and prevents effective judicial investigation or consideration of the
situations of fact behind or bearing upon the statutes." 16
In exactly the same vein as Dean Pound, Professor Felix Frankfurter, writing in 1924 in defense of the refusal of the federal courts
I3 Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 652 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
:14El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497, 533 (1965)
(Black, J., dissenting).
15 Cf. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 62 (1936).
16Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE L.J. 454, 458 (1909).
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to issue advisory opinions, hailed this practice as wise precisely because
it permitted constitutional cases to be decided, not as abstract questions
of formal law, but in the clear light of facts demonstrating the actual
effects of the challenged law upon the society. He observed: "Concepts
like 'liberty' and 'due process' are too vague in themselves to solve
issues. They derive meaning only if referred to adequate human
facts. Facts and facts again are decisive." " It is, of course, striking
that Professor Frankfurter, writing in the 1920's, was so insistent
upon the examination of facts, while Justice Frankfurter, serving on
the Court after the New Deal revolution of 1937, often proved reluctant to consider them. This inconsistency, however, is not as perplexing as it might at first appear. Facts can be used to provide the
basis for the constitutionality, as well as the unconstitutionality, of
legislation. Prior to 1937, when the Supreme Court was not above
striking down social welfare laws on the basis of the due process clause
or the tenth amendment, as unreasonable, or arbitrary, or not treating
a proper subject of governmental concern, it tended to give notoriously
scant attention to available factual information that demonstrated conclusively that the laws in question were reasonable and dealt with
matters which were quite properly within the scope of public concern.18
Here the advocates of judicial self-restraint justifiably urged the Court
not to blind itself to the facts. When, on the other hand, judicial selfrestraint in economic cases became the order of the day, and civil
liberties cases became the primary focus of the Supreme Court's attention, the facts that were presented to the Court often were presented
for the purpose of showing, not that the challenged law was reasonable,
but that it was unreasonable, or abridged individual freedom without
effectively meeting a real social need. It was these facts which the
advocates of self-restraint wished to dismiss as irrelevant to the purposes of judicial concern, for, it was argued, these facts had to do with
the question of the wisdom or appropriateness of legislation-a matter
within the exclusive province of the legislature. 9
It may readily be granted that questions relative to the wisdom
or appropriateness of, or the public interest or public need behind,
legislative enactments are usually settled finally by legislative judgment.
If questions of constitutional authority are not raised, such legislative
li

Frankfurter, A Note on Advisory Opinions, 37 H.Av. L.

REv.

1002, 1004-05

(1924).

18 See, e.g., Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936) ; Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45

(1905).
19 See, e.g., Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960); Barenblatt v. United

States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959) ; Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 490-96 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 646-71 (1943)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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facts are not material to the validity of the statute. If the authority
to enact a federal law is found within the delegated powers of Congress,
and the law cannot reasonably be said to violate any of the constitutional prohibitions on congressional action, it is enough that Congress
has seen a need and has acted to meet it.20 But where the exercise
of legislative power approaches a constitutionally prohibited area, as in
legislation restricting speech, the question of need becomes crucial, and
no sound constitutional judgment can be made except by consideration
of legislative facts. A law which appears on its face or in application to
constitute an abridgment of speech-or a prohibition of the free exercise of religion, or a denial of the equal protection of the laws by a
state, or a state obstruction of interstate commerce, or that has any other
effect that the federal or state governments are constitutionally forbidden to achieve-must be justified in terms of an overriding public
need relative to the extent of the abridgment. Unless the Court is to
adopt the absolutist position, and refuse to accept any justification for
the law, or to decline to enforce the constitutional prohibition by adopting the position of self-restraint and accepting any superfically
plausible justification, it must examine the sufficiency of the justification put forward. This may perhaps be described as questioning the
judgment of the legislature as to the wisdom or appropriateness of the
legislature's enactments, but it is nonetheless an unavoidable exercise
of the Court's political responsibility.
Doubtful constitutional questions can never be answered entirely
irrespective of legislative considerations of public need. Interpretation
of the provisions of the Constitution must be carried out with full
attention paid to the practical effect of choosing one construction over
others. This is no less true for the apparently absolute provisions
(except perhaps for those expressed with mathematical precision) than
for those which are plainly vague and flexible. It is precisely because
the society could not tolerate a literal construction of the first amendment that considerations of social expediency have played an important
role in its interpretation. Likewise even though Congress and the
states are forbidden to enact ex post facto laws and bills of attainder,
20 There is a distinction between "need" and "purpose" which should be noted.
The existence of a need for a law is not always constitutionally relevant, the existence
of a purpose is. In other words, an unnecessary law may be enacted for a valid
purpose, and is not unconstitutional simply because it is unnecessary. Thus, John
Marshall, in upholding the constitutionality of the national bank, declared: "But were
its necessity less apparent, none can deny its being an appropriate measure; and if
it is, the degree of its necessity, as has been justly observed, is to be discussed in
another place." McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 423 (1819). A
purposeless law, on the other hand, raises due process questions. As Professor Louis
Henkin has noted: "Due process of law demands that legislation have a proper public
purpose; only an apparent, rational, utilitarian social purpose satisfies due process."
Henkin, Morals and the Constitution: The Sin of Obscenity, 63 CoLum. L. REV. 391,
402 (1963).

RELEVANCE OF LEGISLATIVE FACTS

and these prohibitions are not apparently qualified by considerations
of public need, from very early in American constitutional history, the
Supreme Court has ruled that the prohibitions against ex post facto
laws are not to be read literally so as to bar all retrospective legislation
but are to apply only to laws imposing, increasing, or making less
difficult the imposition of punishment for a past act. Not the least of
the Court's reasons for so deciding was the recognition of the existence
of a valid public need for retrospective enactments in areas other than
criminal law.2 Nor has the Court defined "bill of attainder" so as to
include all laws which operate with harshly adverse effect upon specified
or readily identifiable individuals or groups. Such laws have been
held to be constitutionally permissible when enacted as a means of
regulating, in the public interest, an activity which is properly subject
to legislative authority; " they are to be deemed prohibited as bills of
attainder when their purpose is not valid regulation but rather infliction
of punishment.23 In other words, only those laws are normally to be
considered bills of attainder which are punitive. A nonpunitive regulatory law would not be invalid unless no substantial public need existed
24
beyond the desire to impose a penalty.
2

1 Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798). In his opinion in that case, Mr.
Justice Chase stated: "[I]t is a good general rule, that a law should have no retrospect: but there are cases in which laws may justly, and for the benefit of the community, and also of individuals, relate to a time antecedent to their commencement.
[S]uch laws may be proper or necessary, as the case may be." Id. at 391. In
the same case, Mr. Justice Iredell declared: "The policy, the reason and humanity of
the prohibition, do not . . . extend to civil cases, to cases that merely affect the
private property of citizens. Some of the most necessary and important acts of
legislation are, on the contrary, founded upon the principle, that private rights must
yield to public exigencies." Id. at 400.
22 See, e.g., Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189 (1898), upholding a New York
law making it a crime for a person convicted of a felony to practice medicine in the
state thereafter. Although convicted felons constitute a readily identifiable group,
and permanent exclusion from the practice of medicine may easily be construed as
punishment of the doctors affected, the Court held that the law was not a bill of
attainder because it was a mere exercise of the valid power of the state to establish
qualifications for those whom it would license to practice medicine. The Court said:
"The State is not seeking to further punish a criminal, but only to protect its citizens
from physicians of bad character." Id. at 196. Similarly, in DeVeau v. Braisted,
363 U.S. 144 (1960), the Court upheld a New York law disqualifying convicted felons
from holding office in waterfront labor organizations. It rejected the claim that the
law was invalid as a bill of attainder or ex post facto law, refusing to strike it down
because it "was felt to be a much-needed scheme of regulation of the waterfront."
Id. at 160. (Emphasis added.)
23 See United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946) ; Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S.
(4 Wall.) 333 (1876); Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1876). The
test for distinguishing punishment from regulation was well stated by the Court in
Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 614 (1960). See text accompanying note 70 infra.
24But see the puzzling decision in United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965),
in which the Court apparently abandoned the test set down in Flemming v. Nestor,
sitpra note 23, in declaring unconstitutional as a bill of attainder § 504 of the LandrumGriffin Act of 1959, 73 Stat. 519, 536, 29 U.S.C. § 504 (1964), prohibiting members
of the Communist Party from holding office in a labor union during the period of
their membership or for five years after its termination. Although the Court conceded the validity of Congress's desire to minimize the danger of political strikes,
this provision was held to be a bill of attainder because "it designates in no uncertain
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Similar examples may be drawn from diverse sections of the
Constitution. Certainly the Court's rejection of the literal construction of the fifth amendment's guarantee against compulsory selfincrimination, in order to uphold statutes authorizing compulsion in
exchange for adequate guarantees of immunity against prosecution,
was based largely on an awareness of the genuine public need to obtain
such testimony.25 Even after this part of the fifth amendment was
held to be applicable to the states through the fourteenth,"0 the Court
refused to hold that state immunity statutes were unconstitutional
because of the inability of states to guarantee immunity against a
federal prosecution that might be made possible by the compelled
testimony. The Court evidently was originally prepared to hold such
state laws unconstitutional on these grounds, but instead declared that
states could grant immunity which would be enforced by an exclusionary rule prohibiting federal prosecution of a witness through the
use of his compelled testimony. It adopted this course rather than
the course of invalidation, although the latter would have appeared to
be more directly in line with the command of the fifth amendment, "in
order [both] to implement this constitutional rule and accommodate
the interest of the State and Federal Governments in investigating and
prosecuting crime."

27

terms the persons who possess the feared characteristics and therefore cannot hold
union office without incurring criminal liability-members of the Communist party."
381 U.S. at 450. Mr. Chief Justice Warren, writing for the majority in the 5-4
decision, made no effort to distinguish such cases as Hawker v. New York or DeVeau
v. Braisted, discussed note 22 supra, upholding statutes which also "designate[d] in no
uncertain terms the persons who possess the feared characteristics and therefore cannot
[practice medicine or] hold union office"--convicted felons-and unconvincingly attempted to distinguish Board of Governors v. Agnew, 329 U.S. 441 (1947), which
upheld an application of the "conflict of interest" provision of the Banking Act of 1933,
§ 32, 48 Stat. 194, as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 78 (1964), prohibiting a person closely connected with a stock underwriting firm from serving as an officer or director of a
federal reserve bank, by contending that that provision applied "to any man-not just
certain men or members of a certain political party." 381 U.S. at 454. As Mr. Justice
White pointed out in his dissent, however, "§ 504 applies to any man who occupies
the two positions of labor union leader and member of the Communist Party." Id.
at 467. Since the Court in Brown, failed to discuss the Hawker and DeVeau cases,
and totally failed even to mention that the very same sentence of § 504 disqualifying
members of the Communist Party from holding union office also imposed the same
disqualification on persons convicted of various felonies, it is possible that the majority
would not employ the reasoning used in this case to invalidate as bills of attainder
laws barring felons from certain activities. As Mr. Justice White again remarked,
this apparent inconsistency "would lead one to inquire whether the Court's reasoning
does not contain some flaw that explains such perverse results." Id. at 472.
25 See Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 596 (1896): "It can only be said in
general that the clause should be construed, as it was doubtless designed, to effect a
practical and beneficent purpose-not . . . to unduly impede, hinder or obstruct
the administration of criminal justice." This judgment was reaffirmed in Ullmann v.
United States, 350 U.S. 422 (1956).
26 Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
27
Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 79 (1964).
It requires little
perspicacity to discern that the Court's judgment in this case was not the one it
originally intended to hand down. The entire thrust of its opinion, up until the last
three pages, which read very much like an afterthought, points quite certainly to the
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With reference to the contract clause of article I, section 10, the
Court recognized early the folly of reading this prohibition against the
states with the uncompromising strictness on which John Marshall
insisted. It has refused to concede the applicability of this clause in
situations in which its invocation would operate to deprive the states of
power to take necessary action in the public interest or to protect the
health and welfare of its citizens.2" In the Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium case of 1934, the Court even permitted the state to pursue a
reasonable plan aimed at alleviating the devastating effects of the depression, although as Mr. Justice Sutherland accurately pointed out in
dissent, the prohibition of mortgage moratoria was one of the specific
reasons for the inclusion of the contract clause in the Constitution. 29
conclusion that state immunity statutes must fall. Moreover, the concurring opinion
of Mr. Justice White, id. at 92-107, was very clearly written originally as a dissent,
with only the necessary superficial changes made to convert it into a concurrence.
As it stands, it is a very strange concurring opinion, indeed, for it is devoted to a
vigorous denunciation of a course the majority did not take. One can surmise, with
considerable confidence, that after the original opinions were circulated, the majority
Justices became convinced of the soundness of Mr. Justice White's argument that
immunity statutes were vital to the effective conduct of law enforcement and investigation activities in the states, and changed their position accordingly.
28 E Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497 (1965) ; East New York Say. Bank v.
Hahn, 326 U.S. 230 (1945); Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398
(1934) ; Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814 (1880) ; Charles River Bridge v. Warren
Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420 (1837); Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.)
213 (1827).
29 Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, .rupra note 28, at 453-54 (Sutherland,
J., dissenting). Mr. Justice Black, with admirable consistency, has objected to denying
absoluteness to the contract clause no less than to the first amendment. See El Paso v.
Simmons, supra note 28, at 517-35 (Black, J., dissenting). However, as in the case
of the first amendment, where he would apply absolutely something other than the
literal meaning, he is also unwilling to apply absolutely the literal meaning of the
contract clause. Conceding that the Texas legislation in question (which, among
other things, amended existing law to require purchasers of public lands forfeited to
the state for non-payment of interest, if they wished to reinstate their claim, to do
so within five years from the time of forfeiture, whereas previously they could have
reinstated at any time prior to resale), was supported by "a valid public purpose"a "need to clear titles and stabilize the market in land"-he would not have interpreted
the contract clause so as to prevent the state from achieving that purpose. Instead,
he would simply have required the state to provide just compensation. Id. at 533-35.
In other words, he would read the clause as stating: "No state shall . . .pass any
. . . Law impairing the obligation of Contracts . . . without just compensation."
That may be a reasonable way of construing the contract clause, but it is not what
the contract clause says. The plain words of the clause are far less liberal and far
more restrictive of the states. Although he has elsewhere tersely observed that:
"The Founders gave no . . . amending power to this Court," Bell v. Maryland,
378 U.S. 226, 342 (1964) (Black, J., dissenting), and in El Paso v. Simmons, supra,
deplored the fact that "this Court's judgment as to 'reasonableness' of a law impairing or even repudiating a valid contract becomes the measure of the Contract
Clause's protection," 379 U.S. at 529, he is himself clearly willing to undertake some
slight amending of the Constitution in the name of reasonableness. In point of fact,
of course, Mr. Justice Black's Simmons position is not consistent with his earlier
views on the scope of the contract clause. See Wood v. Lovett, 313 U.S. 362, 372-86
(1941) (Black, J., dissenting). In that case, he dissented, joined by Justices Douglas
and Murphy, from a decision striking down, on the basis of the contract clause, an
Arkansas statute repealing an earlier state law prohibiting courts from setting aside
the sale of property obtained by the state because of nonpayment of taxes. After
quoting with obvious approval various passages from Blaisdell declaring that the
question in contract clause cases was "one of reasonableness," and that "the prohibition is not an absolute one and is not to be read with literal exactness like a
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It must be granted that constitutional arguments based on necessity may be open to suspicion. Mr. Justice Jackson, in rejecting the
government's contention in the steel seizure case of 1952, thus commented: "The plea is for a resulting power to deal with a crisis or an
emergency according to the necessities of the case, the unarticulated
assumption being that necessity knows no law." 1o Because of its ready
availability to totalitarian regimes to justify abandonment of the rule
of law, the idea that "necessity knows no law" excites a natural abhorrence. But one need not accept all implications of this ideaalthough it is certainly true that as necessity becomes increasingly
desperate for individuals or nations it becomes increasingly unrealistic
to expect strict observance of settled legal rules, a fact that Mr. Justice
Jackson expressly recognized elsewhere." What must be conceded is
that law must be kept abreast of social necessity, and that just as
Congress has the responsibility of keeping statutory rules in line with
current social needs, the Supreme Court has the responsibility of insuring that the Constitution does not become an insurmountable barrier to
the accomplishment of valid and essential national goals.
However, when the Court accepts something other than a literal
interpretation of the Constitution in order to accommodate it to the
mathematical formula," id. at 382, he declared that that decision "represented a
realistic appreciation of the fact that ours is an evolving society and that the general
words of the contract clause were not intended to reduce the legislative branch of
government to helpless impotency," id. at 383. In El Paso v. Simmons, supra at 527
n.17, Mr. Justice Black conceded that he had dissented in Wood v. Lovett but added:
"Even had my dissent prevailed, however, that case would not have supported the
Court's holding in the case before us." Just why it would not have supported it is not
made clear.
-oYoungstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 646 (1952) (Jackson,
J., concurring). The decision in this case, invalidating President Truman's effort
to avoid a steel strike and maintain uninterrupted steel production during the Korean
War by seizing the steel industry, does not really represent, as it might appear, an
instance in which the Court forthrightly refused to sacrifice constitutional limitations
to the necessities of national crisis. In this case, Congress had refused to acquiesce
in the President's action, indicating its firm belief that seizure was not necessary, and
various alternative means of averting the strike were readily available. Had there been
general agreement in Congress that the President's action was necessary to preserve
the military capacity of the nation in wartime, and had alternative means not been
available, one does not have to read very deeply into the opinions of at least four
of the six Justices comprising the majority (including Mr. Justice Jackson) to be
convinced that the Court's ruling would have gone the other way. Mr. Justice
Jackson, in fact, earlier in his opinion, stated that in the absence of congressional
opposition to presidential action, "any actual test of power is likely to depend on the
imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables rather than on abstract theories of law." Id. at 637. (Emphasis added.)
31 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 242-48 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting). The Korematsi decision and Mr. Justice Jackson's opinion in that case
have been severely criticised-see, e.g., Rostow, The Japanese American Cases-A
Disaster,54 YALE L.J. 489 (1945), reprinted in RosTow, THE SovEREIGN PREROGATIVE
193-266 (1962)-and from the vantage point of the present it is simply impossible to
defend the Court's ruling. Nevertheless, the most devastating criticism of Korematz
has always been that the exclusion policy was totally unnecessary, and that that fact
was, or should have been, apparent to the Court. It would be far more difficult to
condemn the decision if one were forced to concede that the war might not have been
won had the Government been denied the power to carry out the exclusion.

RELEVANCE OF LEGISLATIVE FACTS

urgent necessities of the time, it often has to face the charge that it is
amending the Constitution rather than interpreting it. Among those
most likely to make this accusation are dissenting Justices who happen
to take a different view of the reasonableness or necessity of the legislation at hand. For example, when the Court upheld the act of
Congress conferring jurisdiction on the federal judiciary to hear
nonfederal cases arising between citizens of a state and citizens of the
District of Columbia, 2 despite the fact that the diversity clause of
article III only extends federal jurisdiction to controversies "between
Citizens of different States," Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in dissent, was
quick to retort that while the vague phrases of the Constitution that
"were purposely left to gather meaning from experience" might be
made adaptable to changing social conditions, no flexibility should be
recognized where the framers had been "explicit and specific." I "Precisely because 'it is a constitution we are expounding,' " he declared,
"we ought not to take liberties with it." 84
But mere disapproval of judicial "amendment" of the Constitution
begs the fundamental question. To the general proposition that the
Court is not authorized to amend the Constitution, all may agree, just
as all may agree with the general proposition that the proper function
of the courts is adjudicating, not legislating. Yet it is universally
recognized that the process of adjudication inevitably carries with it a
not inconsiderable responsibility for setting policy-i.e., for legislating.
Courts, in deciding whether an existing precedent should be treated as
controlling or distinguished, in deciding among various plausible
interpretations of the language of a statute or simply in deciding between plaintiff and defendant where a persuasive case can be made for
either side, are engaged in law making, and no pious incantation of
the doctrine of separation of powers can or should obscure that fact.35
Stat. 143 (1940) (now 28 U.S.C. § 1332(b) (1964)).
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 646-47 (1949)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Despite his normal posture of deference to the legislature, this is one of a number of cases in which Mr. Justice Frankfurter dissented
from the judgment of the Court upholding an act of Congress against a constitutional
challenge. See also Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957);
Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945). At least one unfriendly commentator
has suggested that questions of governmental form (federalism and separation of
powers) were of greater importance to him than questions of substantive content of
legislation, with the result that his dedicated deference in cases involving the latter
type of question did not extend to cases involving the former. Rodell, For Every
Justice Deference Is a Sometime Thing, 50 GEO. L.J. 700, 706-07 (1962).
34National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., supra note 33, at 647. A
similar exchange occurred in the debate between Justices Goldberg and Black over the
unresolved, and, since the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, apparently moot,
question of whether the fourteenth amendment, of itself, barred states from prosecuting Negroes for "sit ins" at privately owned places of public accommodation. See
Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 315, 341-42 (1964).
35 Among many revealing works on the judicial process, see CARDozo, THE NATURE
oF THE JUDIcIAL PROCESS (1921); FRANK, LAW AND THE MoDERx MIND (1930);
LEvi, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING (1949).
3254

38 National
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Similarly, the judicial task of constitutional interpretation involves Constitution making. In one sense each decision which gives a
definitive construction to a particular provision of the Constitution
may be said to amend it-at least to the extent of clarifying it and
foreclosing other potentially acceptable alternative interpretations.
Unless one chooses to pretend that the construction chosen by the
Supreme Court has been hidden in the text all along, and has only
been "found" by the Court, the Constitution must undergo some
change when one of its provisions is authoritatively interpreted. Rejecting the view that judicial affirmation of a social custom is not law
making, John Dewey once stated that "something happens when a
custom becomes a law," and that the judicial action involved contains
"an element which is additive and in a sense . . . creative." 86 This
idea may be appropriately transferred to the area of constitutional law.
Something indeed happens when the Supreme Court interprets a constitutional provision of sufficiently doubtful meaning that a legal dispute
has arisen regarding it, and that something is in the nature of a
change, "an element which is additive and in a sense . . . creative."

This is not to say that the Court should be free to rewrite the
Constitution at will, ignoring what it chooses to ignore and inserting
what it chooses to insert. Max Radin's admonition, made with regard
to the limits of statutory interpretation, has validity for constitutional
law: "Words are certainly not crystals, as Mr. Justice Holmes has
wisely and properly warned us, but they are after all not portmanteaus.
We can not quite put anything we like into them." 3' But, within the
limits of reasonableness and prudence, the Supreme Court must be,
and has been, prepared to construe the provisions of the Constitution
strictly or liberally, to apply its terms (or to refuse to apply them) to
novel situations, in order not to allow a section or a phrase to defeat
those basic purposes set forth by the framers themselves in the Preamble: "[T]o form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure
domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the
general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and
our Posterity."
Technically, judicial interpretation and reinterpretation of the
Constitution may be characterized as "amendment." But, if so defined,
the Supreme Court has an entirely proper role in the "amending"
process. The words of the Constitution, as Mr. Justice Holmes remarked in a famous passage, "must be considered in the light of our
36

Dewey, Book Review, 28 COLUM. L. REv. 832, 833 (1928); cf. ALLEN, LAW
152-56 (7th ed. 1964).
ST Radin, supra note 7, at 866. (Footnote omitted.) Holmes' aphorism is from
Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918).
IN THE MAKING
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whole experience and not merely in that of what was said a hundred
years ago." 38 Surely, if the Court had not undertaken the task of
continual "amendment" through reinterpretation, the document of 1787
could not have survived to the present day in recognizable form. If
the nation had had to rely on what John Marshall described as the
"unwieldly and cumbrous machinery of procuring a recommendation
from two-thirds of Congress and the assent of three-fourths of . . .
[the] States" '9for every revision of emphasis or construction, the
Constitution would either have taken on the "prolixity of a legal
code" or have stagnated. Even those simple changes required solely by
the passage of time would have been rendered enormously troublesome.
The interpretive function of the Court, it was noted by Mr. Justice
Jackson, is marked by "its indispensability to government under a
written Constitution." 40
Evidence of the importance of judicial interpretation in constitutional change is the Supreme Court's traditional use of stare decisis
in the realm of constitutional law. If the Court lacked power to effect
any changes in the Constitution, stare decisis should be particularly
strong in this area, for judicial abandonment of a constitutional interpretation can alter the meaning of the document as fully as formal
amendment. The accepted attitude, however, is that stare decisis is to
be less binding in constitutional decisions than in those involving the
interpretation of a statute41 since change through reinterpretation is
not only simpler but qualitatively different from change through formal
amendment. This distinction has been best described by Edward
H. Levi:
It may be suggested that the doctrine should be otherwise; that as with legislation so with a constitution, the interpretation ought to remain fixed in order to permit the people
through legislative machinery, such as the constitutional convention or the amending process, to make a change. But the
answer lies not only in the difficulties of obtaining an amendment, nor the difficult position of a court which obdurately
refuses to interpret common words in a way ordinary citizens
believe to be proper. The more complete answer is that a written constitution must be enormously ambiguous in its general
provisions. If there has been an incorrect interpretation of
the words, an amendment would come close to repeating the
3
8Missouri
3

v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920).
9 Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet) 153, 158 (1833).
40 JACKSON, THE SUPRFME COURT IN THE AmERICAN SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT
26 (1955). The quotation, which was originally part of a lecture delivered in 1946
to the Ministry of Justice of France, continued: "It is difficult to see how the provisions of a 150-year-old written document can have much vitality if there is not
some permanent institution to translate them into current commands and to see to
their contemporary application." Ibid.
41 See the discussion of this point by Mr. Justice Brandeis in Burnet v. Coronado
Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 405-10 (1932) (dissenting opinion).
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same words. What is desired is a different emphasis, not
different language. This is tantamount to saying that what
is required is a different interpretation rather than an
amendment.42
The history of the first amendment provides an excellent illustration of the wisdom of Professor Levi's observation. Who would wish
to amend that amendment? Who would wish to clutter its simplicity
with an attempt at an exhaustive list of the exceptions that must be
made to the rule that "Congress [or state legislatures] shall make no
law"? The first amendment embodies the ideal of freedom for the
individual, and if the constitutional dignity of that ideal is not to be
buried in needless verbiage, an amended version of it "would come
close to repeating the same words." The courts remain then as the
medium to transmute that ideal into working rules of practical
operation.
First amendment absolutists, it should be noted, despite their
insistence to the contrary, are not uninfluenced by the needs of present
society. Although Mr. Justice Black in his James Madison lecture
heaped scorn upon judges who would allow social considerations to
affect their interpretation of unequivocal constitutional language, his
own interpretation of the first amendment is so affected. In Cox v.
Louisiana, for example, he would have upheld the convictions of the
civil rights demonstrators. He justified his position by stating that
the first and fourteenth amendments cannot "grant a constitutional
right to engage in the conduct of picketing or patrolling," because:
"Were the law otherwise, people on the streets, in their homes and
anywhere else could be compelled to listen against their will to speakers
they did not want to hear." ' But, on his own terms, how can he
make such a statement? On his own terms, a judge must treat as
absolutely irrelevant all considerations related to the social consequences that may be anticipated from the absolutist interpretation of
constitutional provisions in general, and the first amendment in particular. If the first amendment is absolute, then, beyond doubt, people
may be "compelled to listen against their will to speakers they [do]
not want to hear." If this is absurd and socially disastrous, it can be
no concern of the judge who takes his commands only from the words
of the Constitution. For the truly absolutist judge, only the amending
process is available to correct manifest deficiencies. Mr. Justice Black,
as judge, does not subscribe to his own constitutional theory in this
42
48

L~vi, op. cit. supra note 35, at 42.
Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U.L. REV. 865, 876-79 (1960).

44379 U.S. 559, 578 (1965)

(separate opinion).
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area, and quite rightly. A judicially modified first amendment provides
greater hope for the protection of freedom of expression than would
the patchwork provision, filled with numerous exceptions, that would
result if the members of the Court were to force reliance on the amending process to correct the absurdities, inequities, and injustices that
would follow from an absolutist interpretation.
Departures from the literal interpretation of constitutional provisions are, of course, not only resorted to for the purpose of validating
legislation. The due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments have done yeoman service for years in the cause of invalidating
legislation which could not be said to be prohibited by any specific
provision of the Constitution. It is striking that while substantive
due process is looked on with general disfavor because of the uses to
which it was put in the half century between the 1880's and the 1930's,45
the doctrine, to the surprise of many, was not abandoned after
Roosevelt appointees came to dominate the Court in the 1940's, but
was merely transferred from the area of the protection of economic
4
rights and liberties to that of the protection of civil rights and liberties. 6
The incorporation of the first amendment and considerable segments
of the remainder of the Bill of Rights into the fourteenth amendment
is simply substantive due process in its new guise,47 although a majority
of the Court now seems disturbed by this discovery. Recently it
has made an unconvincing effort to assert that there is no resemblance
whatever between earlier substantive due process and the present incorporation procedure, even when that which is incorporated is not
merely the literal meaning of certain provisions of the Bill of Rights,
but meanings that are to be found in "penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and substance." 48
45 See, e.g., Hamilton, The Path of Due Process of Law, in THE CoNs~rrlrnoN
RECoNSmEP- 167 (Read ed. 1938). Perhaps the most eloquent statement of disapproval of the excesses of substantive due process may be found in the dissenting
opinion of Mr. Justice Holmes in Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 344 (1921):
There is nothing that I more deprecate than the use of the Fourteenth
Amendment beyond the absolute compulsion of its words to prevent the making of social experiments that an important part of the community desires,
in the insulated chambers afforded by the several States, even though the
experiments may seem futile or even noxious to me and to those whose
judgment I most respect.

48See generally PRrrcH-ra,

THE RoosEvELT COURT 91-136 (1948).

47 See Green, The Bill of Rights, The Fourteenth Amendment, and the Supreme

Court, 46 MIcH. L. REv. 869 (1948) ; Warren, The New "Liberty" Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 39 HARv. L. REv. 431 (1926). The most recent decisions of the
Supreme Court extending the list of incorporated provisions are: Pointer v. Texas,
380 U.S. 400 (1965) (confrontation of witnesses); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1
(1964) (compulsory self-incrimination) ; Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)
(assistance of counsel); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (cruel and
unusual punishment).
48 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
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But surely it cannot reasonably be denied that when the fourteenth
amendment, which forbids states to "deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law," is judicially interpreted to
prohibit states from abridging freedom of speech, just as much substantive content is added to the amendment as when it is interpreted
to prohibit states from abridging freedom of contract, and this is no
less true merely because, elsewhere in the Constitution, the first amendment prohibits the federal government from abridging the freedom of
speech. If the incorporation of the plain meaning of the provisions of
the Bill of Rights is substantive due process, it is clearly also substantive
due process when that which is incorporated is not the plain meaning
of the provision but its penumbral emanations.
Thus while the result arrived at by the Court in striking down
the Connecticut anti-contraceptive statute would appear sound, it was
not so because the Court followed an inexorable command of the
Constitution in that case any more than it did in the freedom of
contract cases.4" Rather the Court's result seems sound because,
unlike maximum hour legislation, the Connecticut statute served a
social purpose that was minimal, if indeed it existed at all, at the cost of
denying even to married couples the right to use contraceptives, and
even if pregnancy were likely to result in serious illness or death to
the wife."° When persons with standing to challenge the constitutionality of a statute present facts to demonstrate that the statute inflicts grave personal hardship and is lacking in social purpose, and
when the government cannot rebut that argument, the Court is on
sound ground in striking down the statute on the basis of the due
process clause. That substantive due process is here to stay was made
clear when the Court could find no better reason for invalidating public
school segregation in the District of Columbia, 5 a practice not forbidden by any express provision of the Constitution, or for protecting
13
the right to travel,5" a right not expressly secured.
49 This was highlighted by the dissent of Mr. Justice Black, who, with Mr.
Justice Stewart, argued that nothing in the Constitution specifically guaranteed the
right of privacy, and that nothing in the due process clause authorized the Court to
strike down a law merely because it thought it unwise or unjust. Id. at 508-13
(dissenting opinion).
60 Cf. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 498-500 (1961) ; id. at 545-55 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
51 Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
62
Aptheker v. Secretary, 378 U.S. 500 (1964); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116

(1958).

53 It is interesting to follow the variations in the positions taken by Mr. Justice
Black on the question of the incorporation of the Bill of Rights into the fourteenth
amendment. While, in his first months on the Court, he silently concurred in Mr.
Justice Cardozo's opinion in Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937), which declared that only those provisions of the Bill of Rights which "have been found to be
implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" were to be absorbed into the fourteenth
amendment, id. at 325, he apparently later realized that this rule of substantive due
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When the Court relies on one of the due process clauses to invalidate state or federal legislation, it is keeping the Constitution abreast
of its best conceptions of fairness and justice-and fairness and justice
may certainly be classified as urgent public needs. The freedom of
contract decisions were not intolerable because they represented substantive due process, but because the justice that the members of the
Court believed they were preserving was, in fact, a manifest injustice.
Decisions such as Lochner v. New York " simply demonstrate how far
out of touch the majority of the Justices were with the social realities
of the industrial revolution. The answer to Lochner, however, is not
to scrap substantive due process any more than to scrap judicial review.
Courts may make erroneous decisions. If, however, their mistakes
result even after an attempt to decide on the basis of social realities,
they will likely be fewer and milder than the mistakes based on a
conception of the judicial function that denies them the right to judge.
It may be comforting to the judges to pretend that their errors in
constitutional cases are not of their own making but simply reflect the
errors of the framers, but it is a dangerous delusion. Morris Raphael
Cohen, writing at a time when the notorious heyday of freedom of
contract was still a fresh memory, recorded ideas which remain
pertinent today:
If, however, there are any principles of political science which
enlightened experience makes clear, they are (1) that the
worst form of government is that which separates power from
responsibility, and (2) that the weakest government is that
which has relatively little access to the sources of information. And does not the fiction that the courts only follow
the words of the Constitution in fact relieve them of the
process was highly subjective.

See Braden, The Search for Objectivity in Consti-

tutional Law, 57 YALE L.J. 571, 589-93 (1948).
Therefore, in order to maintain a
position of constitutional absolutism, he attempted to argue that the entire Bill of
Rights was incorporated into the fourteenth amendment, not because of fundamental
fairness, but simply because that was the intention of the framers of the amendment.
Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68 (1947) (dissenting opinion). This argument
was based on historical evidence, the validity of which was dubious at best. See
Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights?, 2 STAN.
L. REv. 5 (1949).
It has never been accepted by a majority of the Court, which
has continued to employ the Palko test. Although Mr. Justice Black has stated that
he still adheres to the views that he expressed in Adamson, Black, The Bill of Rights,
35 N.Y.U.L. REv. 865, 866 (1960), he has sufficiently succumbed to the majority view
that he has been able to write opinions for the Court in recent incorporation decisions
using the selective incorporation language of Palko. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400,
403 (1965); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963).
His acceptance of
selective incorporation is somewhat surprising since the practice requires a subjective
decision as to which provisions of the Bill of Rights are fundamental and which are
not See Henkin, "Selective Incorporation!"in the Fourteenth Amendment, 73 YALE

L.J. 74 (1963). He explained this in a footnote to his dissent in Griswold v. Connecticut, supra at 526 n.21, by stating that he "agreed to follow" the Palko rule as
a second-best method that would "make [at least some of the] Bill of Rights safeguards applicable to the States."

,4 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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responsibility, and (2) that the weakest government is that
it not also true that this fiction that the courts decide only
questions of law prevents us from organizing the courts so
that they could have the opportunity of making adequate investigation into the actual facts on which they have to pass?
Do we want our judges to be not only -irresponsible to any
earthly power, but also independent of adequate knowledge
of the social consequences of their decisions? "
III. CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITIONS AND THE PRESUMPTION OF
CONSTITUTIONALITY

Recognition of the propriety of judicial examination of legislative
facts in constitutional cases, even for the purpose of ascertaining the
extent of the public need for a challenged statute, is hardly a novel
development. The necessity of such examination to the adequate performance of the functions of the federal courts was established, with
regard to acts of Congress (once the Supreme Court had successfully
asserted the existence of the power of judicial review), by the presence
of the "necessary and proper" clause in article I, section 8 of the
Constitution. By the terms of this clause, if the federal courts were to
have the responsibility of reviewing the constitutionality of congressional legislation when appropriately challenged in litigation, they
had the inevitable responsibility of determining whether a law not
plainly within the scope of a delegated power was, in fact, "necessary
and proper" to the execution of such a power. And "necessary"
refers to need. Although the historic decision in McCulloch v.
Maryland," of course, wisely rejected the argument that "necessary"
be interpreted as meaning "absolutely or indispensably necessary,"
adopting instead a far more permissive and flexible interpretation,5 7
the Court could not avoid considering and ruling on the question of
whether a national bank was necessary, in the sense of being appropriate, to the execution of Congress's delegated powers. Had it not
been appropriate, said Marshall, "it would become the painful duty of
this tribunal .

.

. to say, that such an act was not the law of the

land." 11
The permissiveness which the Marshall Court read into the
"necessary and proper" clause is entirely fitting when the question involved is simply whether or not a congressional act is within the scope
of the powers delegated to the federal government. As Marshall noted,
55
CoHN, THE FArter OF A LIBERAL 192-93 (1946).
56 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316, 413-21 (1819).
-57 The Court declared: "Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of
the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to
that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the
constitution, are constitutional." Id. at 421. (Footnote omitted.)
58 d. at 423.
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such permissiveness is essential if federal power is to be kept adequate
to meet the changing needs of society over a period of decades and
centuries, and if the Constitution is "to be adapted to the various
crises of human affairs." 9 However, when the question involves a
constitutional prohibition, permissiveness alone is insufficient, and the
question of public need may become crucial. Here the qualification of
"absolutely or indispensably necessary" may prove a more meaningful
standard for constitutional judgment. For example, while it is true
that a relatively insignificant abridgment of freedom of speech, such as
a restriction on the use of sound trucks, may be permissible for reasons
of appropriateness and convenience, serious abridgments, such as
punishment for the expression of an idea, should only be upheld as
constitutional in that very rare case where it can reasonably be shown
that the abridgment is "absolutely or indispensably necessary" in the
public interest, as a means of averting an immediate threat of serious
public disorder.
If standards of constitutionality are variable, the presumption of
constitutionality must also vary. 0 The mere willingness of the courts
to examine legislative facts demonstrates that the presumption of
constitutionality traditionally accorded to the acts of the legislature is
not conclusive. 6' Nevertheless, it is hardly necessary that the presumption be abandoned. It is necessary, however, that it be treated as
rebuttable and that full opportunity be given for the presentation of
evidence that would tend to refute it. Where no constitutional prohibition is encountered but only an allegation that Congress has exceeded its authority, the presumption should be at its strongest, and
the party challenging the statute must show that the legislation is
wholly inappropriate to the proper exercise of any of the powers of
government. Recent decisions on the scope of the war, commerce and
taxing powers of the federal government would indicate that this is a
2
formidable task indeed.6
But rare is the case where a challenged statute is only alleged to
be in excess of legislative authority. A law without a proper and
valid public purpose is by definition a violation of substantive due
59 Id. at 415 (emphasis in original).
60 There is no reason to assume that the presumption of constitutionality is of
equal strength in all cases. There is obviously a stronger basis for such a presumption
in the case of a federal tariff, for example, than in the case of a federal censorship
law. See Karst, Legislative Facts in Constitutional Litigation, 1960 SUPREME COURT
REv. 75, 86-95.
61 Freund, Review of Facts in Constitutional Cases, in SUPREME CoURT AND
SUPREME LAW 49 (Cahn ed. 1954).
62 Regarding the commerce power, see Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294

(1964), upholding Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 241, 42 U.S.C.
§2000(a) (1964).
In its decision upholding the ban on racial discrimination in a
restaurant whose only apparent connection with interstate commerce was that a sub-
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process, and a litigant who is deprived of liberty or property is certain
to raise a due process claim at least. The mere addition of such a
claim, of course, would not of itself appreciably weaken the presumption of constitutionality, for the burden of proof would still lie with
the party challenging the statute to demonstrate that, in the words
of Holmes's famous dissent in Lochner v. New York,63 "a rational
and fair man necessarily would admit that the statute . . . infringe[d]

fundamental principles as they have been understood by the traditions
of our people and our law," or, more simply, that it was unreasonablethat it deprived persons of liberty or property without serving a genuine
public purpose.6 Similarly, a claim that the challenged statute violated
an express constitutional prohibition would not by the mere fact of its
assertion measurably affect the presumption unless it could be shown
that the violation was not trivial, that it might have serious effects on
individuals or on the public, or that the public purpose said to be served
was not sufficiently great. In either the case of the substantive due
process claim or the claim involving the express constitutional prohibition, however, the presumption afforded the statute would become
progressively weaker as the magnitude of the social interest the legislature was seeking to protect became smaller, or as the social importance
of the guarantee being abridged, or the degree of its abridgment, became greater.
According to the doctrine of "preferred position," a presumption
of unconstitutionality may be said to be appropriate when a law is
challenged as an abridgment of freedom of expression.6 It would seem
unnecessary, however, to place the burden of proof on the government
from the outset if the Court is willing to weigh carefully the evidence
that the law constitutes too great an abridgment of a protected liberty
stantial portion of the food it purchased came from out of state, a unanimous Court
declared:
[W]here we find that the legislators, in light of the facts and testimony
before them, have a rational basis for finding a chosen regulatory scheme
necessary to the protection of commerce, our investigation is at an end. . . .
The absence of direct evidence connecting discriminatory restaurant
service with the flow of interstate food, a factor on which appellees place
much reliance, is not, given the evidence as to the effect of such practices
on other aspects of commerce, a crucial matter.
The power of Congress in this field is broad and sweeping; where it keeps
within its sphere and violates no express constitutional limitation it has been
the rule of this Court, going back almost to the founding days of the Republic,
not to interfere.
379 U.S. at 303-05. Regarding the war power, see Woods v. Miller, 333 U.S. 138
(1948) ; Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). Regarding the taxing
power, see United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22 (1953).
63198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (dissenting opinion).
64 "The requirements of due process are a function not only of the extent of the
governmental restriction imposed, but also of the extent of the necessity for the
restriction." Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 14 (1965). (Footnote omitted.)
65 See BLAck, THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT 215-22 (1960).
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for the social purpose it is claimed to serve.

Mr. Justice Stone's

Carolene Productsfootnote speaks only of a "narrower" presumption of
constitutionality,66 and Mr. Justice Rutledge, in Thomas v. Collins,
described the presumption as being "balanced" by the preferred position
conceded to first amendment freedoms0 7 These conceptions would
seem more appropriate than a complete reversal of the presumption.
Since, in such cases, the presumption is offset, or "balanced," by the
existence of a general or express constitutional prohibition, the task
of the Court must be to weigh the degree of public necessity underlying
the statute against the seriousness of the violation of a constitutional
prohibition and to make its decision regarding constitutionality on
the basis of the preponderance of the factual evidence.
It would be a serious error for the Court to raise the presumption
of constitutionality to such a level of conclusiveness that it decides
constitutional questions irrespective of the weight of contradictory
factual evidence. It would be an equally serious error to reverse the
presumption and automatically to treat as unconstitutional any statute
which appears in any way to trench upon rights protected by a constitutional prohibition, regardless of the factual data that the government
may present to demonstrate the public need for the law or the limited
extent of its actual abridgment of these rights. The latter error is
inherent in constitutional absolutism, and its manifestations may be
found in the freedom of contract decisions of the old Court and in the
exaggerated protection given to freedom of speech in the days of the
primacy of the doctrine of "preferred position." " The former error
is the hallmark of judicial self-restraint, and it results in the incapacity
of the courts to enforce constitutional guarantees against the encroachment of the political branches.
An outstanding example of the abuse of the presumption of constitutionality to uphold a statute was presented in the 1960 case of
Flemming v. Nestor.6 9 The case concerned the constitutionality of
section 202(n) of the Social Security Act, as amended in 1954, which
provided for the termination of social security benefit payments to any
alien deported for one of fourteen reasons, including past membership
in the Communist Party, and under which the old age benefits of an
6

SUnited States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).

323 U.S. 516, 529-30 (1945).
See BERNS, FREmDom, VmTUE
69 363 U.S. 603 (1960).
67
68

AND THE FmST AMENDMENT

73-128 (1957).
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alien, who had belonged to the Party in the 1930's and who had been
deported for that reason in 1956, had been halted. The basic constitutional contentions that were raised were that section 202(n) inflicted punishment without a trial, and that it constituted an ex post
facto law and bill of attainder. The Court properly recognized that
the crucial constitutional test was whether the statute was intended to
impose punishment, and the test for identifying punishment put forward
by Mr. Justice Harlan for the five to four majority was unexceptionable:
Where the source of legislative concern can be thought to be
the activity or status from which the individual is barred, the
disqualification is not punishment even though it may bear
harshly upon one affected. The contrary is the case where
the statute in question is evidently aimed at the person or
class of persons disqualified."
In other words, if the purpose of section 202 (n) was related to the
administration and functioning of the social security system or to any
other proper governmental purpose, it did not impose punishment and
was, therefore, constitutional even though those deprived were made
to suffer a serious loss. If, on the other hand, the provision had no
relationship to a valid governmental purpose but was enacted merely
as an expression of congressional disapproval of the acts leading to
deportation, it would constitute punishment and would be invalid.
However, after having stated the test, Mr. Justice Harlan, second at
the time only to Mr. Justice Frankfurter in his devotion to selfrestraint, proceeded to answer the questions it posed, not by a consideration of the available evidence that could have led the Court to
believe that Congress had one or the other purpose in mind, but simply
by pointing to the presumption of constitutionality. He refused to
consider any factor that would tend to show that the law served an
invalid purpose on the ground that consideration of such factors would
71
not constitute faithful adherence to the presumption's requirements.
Thus, under this use of the presumption, if any reason at all could be
suggested for believing that Congress was concerned with the regulation of social security or the protection of the economy rather than
with the misdeeds of those otherwise eligible for benefit payments, the
Court must then assume that that was the reason underlying the
enactment, regardless of the strength of the evidence or the cogency
7

OId. at 614.
We observe initially that only the clearest proof could suffice to establish

71

the unconstitutionality of a statute on such a ground. .-.

. Moreover, the

presumption of constitutionality with which this enactment, like any other,
comes to us forbids us lightly to choose that reading of the statute's setting
which will invalidate it over that which will save it.
Id. at 617.
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of the arguments demonstrating that Congress merely desired to
penalize persons deported for what it deemed to be the wrong reason.
Moreover, Mr. Justice Harlan made it clear that if the government
was not prepared to suggest any reasoning by which the statute could be
upheld, the Court would supply the necessary imaginativeness. Even
in the face of the fact that benefits were not cut off in the case of
citizens or aliens voluntarily living outside the country or in the case
of aliens who were deported for reasons not generally considered
reprehensible, and in the absence of any positive evidence that Congress
had a valid purpose in mind, the Court still said that it was possible
that the termination of payments only to those aliens deported for the
commission of reprehensible acts might have been intended to meet a
public need and not further to penalize the deportees-and if it was
possible, all evidence of its improbability must be rejected as irrelevant.7 2 Thus, under the banner of judicial self-restraint, the Court
raised the presumption of constitutionality to an insurmountable level.
It denied its own capacity to enforce the constitutional prohibitions
against the legislative imposition of punishment by denying to itself the
power to exercise judgment and, thereby, to carry out its judicial
function properly. It may be conceded that the presumption would
indeed have required upholding the statute if any adequate reasoning
could have been advanced to support a genuine belief that section
202(n) was intended to serve a valid purpose-for example, protect
the balance of payments, strengthen the economy or improve social
security. But completely to substitute the presumption for such reasoning is nothing less than an abdication of judicial duty. For it is all
but impossible not to believe that upon full consideration of all the
data available to the Court "a rational and fair man necessarily would
admit that the statute .

.

. infringe[d] fundamental principles as they

have been understood by the traditions of our people and our law." 7

IV. THE

PRESUMPTION OF CONSTITUTIONALITY AND THE
APPLICATION OF STATUTES

The presumption of constitutionality permits the Supreme Court
to extend to legislatures, both federal and state, the deference that
courts are normally expected to concede to their policy determinations.
There is thus sound basis for its observance, provided that it is not
employed entirely in the place of judgment. No such strong basis for
the entertainment of the presumption exists, however, when the Court
72 "[W]e cannot with confidence reject all those alternatives which imaginativeness can bring to mind, save that one which might require the invalidation of the
statute." Id. at 621.
7
3Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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is not being asked to overturn all or part of a statute together with the
legislative policy it embodies but is, instead, faced with a challenge to
the constitutionality of a particular application of a statute. The difference is that the application need not be an actual reflection of legislative policy. As Kenneth Karst has noted, "when there is no judgment by a legislature at all, as in cases of abuse of power by law
enforcement officials, there is little justification for any presumption
of constitutionality." 7'
This distinction can, however, easily be exaggerated. In a period
of the ever increasing complexity of subjects governmentally regulated
and thus of a mounting need for flexibility in governmental response,
Congress and the state legislatures have necessarily come to rely to
a very great extent on administrative expertise "to fill up the details"
of legislation drafted in general terms. 75 It would, of course, be a grave
mistake to assume that administrative rule making under such conditions is somehow less legitimate than direct legislative action, or that
the decision by a legislature to turn a problem over to the administration with only vague standards to serve as a guide does not manifest
a genuine policy determination that the matter be settled by administrative discretion. Therefore, it would be entirely improper for the
courts simply to abandon the presumption of constitutionality when
dealing with administrative law making, and to suggest, as was the
vogue not long ago, that all policy decisions by administrators constitute a usurpation of authority.78 In fact the Supreme Court has
not taken this course, and has expressly conceded to administrative
regulations an entitlement to the presumption equivalent to that of
statutes.
74

Karst, supra note 60, at 87.
7-5The quoted phrase belongs to Mr. Chief Justice Marshall. Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 43 (1825).
78

See, e.g.,

HEvART,

THE NEW Dasporism (1929).

77 It

is urged that this rebuttable presumption of the existence of a state of
facts sufficient to justify the exertion of the police power attaches only to
acts of legislature; and that where the regulation is the act of an administrative body, no such presumption exists, so that the burden of proving the
justifying facts is upon him who seeks to sustain the validity of the regulation.
The contention is without support in authority or reason, and rests upon

misconception. Every exertion of the police power, either by the legislature
or by an administrative body, is an exercise of delegated power.

Where it

is by a statute, the legislature has acted under power delegated to it through
the Constitution. Where the regulation is by an order of an administrative
body, that body acts under a delegation from the legislature. The question
of law may, of course, always be raised whether the legislature had power

to delegate the authority exercised. . . . But where the regulation is within
the scope of authority legally delegated, the presumption of the existence of
facts justifying its specific exercise attaches alike to statutes, to municipal
ordinances, and to orders of administrative bodies.

Mr. Justice Brandeis in Pacific States Box & Basket Co. v. White, 296 U.S. 176,
185-86 (1935).
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Nevertheless where administrative application brings a statute
which is on its face innocuous into an area where it threatens to
abridge or restrict rights deemed worthy of active judicial protection,
the Court should hesitate before leaping to the conclusion that the
administrative action at hand is an accurate reflection of legislative
policy and is, therefore, worthy of an equivalent degree of deference.
Before deciding, the Court must seek answers to such questions as
whether the particular application that raises constitutional questions is essential to the accomplishment of the purposes of the statute,
or merely useful, or unnecessary; whether the potential abridgment
was contemplated by the legislature; and, as always, whether the application can be justified by the urgency of the public need relative to
the degree and significance of the abridgment.
At the federal level, the perfect examples of administrative overzealousness deserving of judicial rebuke were the two thousand prosecutions brought during World War I under the Espionage Act of
1917.7' The act, among other things, prohibited willful attempts to
cause insubordination and disloyalty in the armed forces, and willful
obstruction of the recruiting or enlistment service 9 and, in these respects, raised no constitutional problems whatever. However the
acts which led to prosecutions under these provisions generally did
not involve genuine attempts to cause insubordination or obstruct
recruiting, but were general statements of opposition to the war or to
conscription, often made in private conversation and not necessarily
to members of the armed forces or to potential draftees 8 0 It would
now be generally conceded that the bulk of these Espionage Act prosecutions raised valid questions under the first amendment precisely
because of the absence of any real threat to the interests protected by
the statute that could have resulted from the statements for which the
defendants were brought to trial. The great virtue of the "clear and
present danger" test, pressed by Justices Holmes and Brandeis as a
response to the rash of convictions obtained in that period, was that it
permitted a constitutional attack on the application of a statute without
requiring an attack on the validity of the statute itself.8' Thus, when
78 See CHAFEE, FRmEom OF SPEECH 42-106 (1920).
7940 Stat. 219 (1917), as amended, 18 U.S.C. §2388(a) (1964).

8o CHAFEE, op. cit. suepra note 78, at 56-66. A particularly bizarre example was
the conviction and imprisonment for three years of the producer of a film on the
American Revolution, patterned after "Birth of a Nation", and entitled "The Spirit
of '76.'" Because the film portrayed British atrocities, it was charged that he had
willfully attempted to cause insubordination in the armed forces by presenting to the
public a motion picture calculated "to arouse antagonism, hatred, and emnity" between
the United States and its military ally, Great Britain. Goldstein v. United States,
258 Fed. 908, 909 (9th Cir. 1919).
81 See Cushman, "Clear and Present Danger" in Free Speech Cases: A Study
in Judicial Semantics, in EssAYs IN POLITICAL THEORY 316 (Konvitz & Murphy ed.
1948).
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the Hughes Court of the 1930's decided to apply the spirit if not the
language of the "clear and present danger" test,8 2 it made clear that
the application of otherwise valid state syndicalism or anti-insurrection
statutes to a speaker, writer or distributor of literature would be constitutional only when there was some clear evidence that danger of
rioting or other disorder was genuinely to be feared. In other words,
when the speech or writing was merely unorthodox or simply expressed ideas offensive to the majority, no public need for suppression
would exist, and thus the laws could not be constitutionally applied.
The legislative policy underlying state syndicalism statutes and
such federal laws as the Espionage Act may in reality be no more
tolerant than the administrative decision leading to the prosecutions,
but the legislature-constitutionally required to generalize-must
normally phrase its policies in a more tolerant manner. The legislature may enact a law against insurrection, or violent overthrow of
the government, or attempts to cause insubordination, with a majority
of its members fully believing that any agitating speech or expression
of offensively unorthodox ideas would constitute a violation. However,
that belief will not normally find its way into the language of the law,
and the common result will be a deliberately repressive law expressed
in terms which are, in themselves, unexceptionable. Here, the Court
may freely presume the constitutionality of the goals expressed in the
legislation, but should be under no compulsion to uphold the particular applications of the general law. Since the administration is
forced to particularize, the Court's focus may be on its actions even
though they are faithful to the actual legislative desires.
Another very similar means by which the Court can protect against
unnecessary abridgment of constitutional rights without upsetting the
presumption of constitutionality is the technique of statutory interpretation. This alternative, since it avoids a constitutional judgment,
would normally be preferable to the invalidation of an application of a
statute, but would not be available when the narrow construction would
destroy or seriously undermine the statute or when the statute had
already been authoritatively construed, as is generally the case when
the Supreme Court is asked to rule on the constitutionality of state
legislation. Thus in a constitutional case involving a federal law
which is susceptible to more than one tenable construction, the Court
can fall back on the assumption, often altogether gratuitous, that
Congress, ever mindful of constitutional limitations, intended the
narrower and perhaps somewhat distorted construction that would not
infringe upon constitutional rights, and that the administrative body
82
E.g., Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937); DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S.
353 (1937).
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alone was in error in applying the broad construction that threatened
This, of course, leaves the way open for
such an infringement.'
Congress to insist upon the broader construction by an unequivocal
redrafting of the law, but such a response is not normally to be
anticipated " since the Court has in effect warned that the new draft
will probably be struck down.
If the claim for the broader construction of the statute is not
frivolous, the selection of the narrower construction for constitutional
reasons may very likely rest on the Court's conception of public need
based on conclusions drawn from legislative facts. Where the narrow
construction of the statute eliminates the constitutional problems altogether, its adoption might indicate that the Court can see no public
need for the statute in its broadest terms that would be sufficient to
warrant the impairment of constitutional rights that might take place
if the broad construction were accepted."5 If, on the other hand, the
adoption of the narrow construction merely alleviates but does not
eliminate the constitutional problems, the Court may see no public need
to dilute the pertinent provision of the Constitution to such an extent
that it would accommodate the broad interpretation urged upon it. It
may either foresee sufficient potential need for a more limited application to warrant refusal to invalidate the law on its face, or it may
deem it impolitic directly to challenge the proponents of the law through
an open declaration of unconstitutionality. In any case, the accepted
procedure is for the Court to note that the broad construction would
raise "grave constitutional questions," and then to demonstrate that
other interpretations are at least plausible. Since rejection of the
8

3 The technique of avoiding constitutional questions through statutory interpretation appeared to be a favorite of the Warren Court until 1959 in civil liberties
cases involving the application of congressional acts or resolutions. See, e.g., Greene
v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959); Dayton v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 144 (1958); Kent v.
Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958); Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957); Cole v.
Young, 351 U.S. 536 (1956); United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41 (1953). The
same technique was also employed frequently in this period in cases involving the
application of executive orders. See, e.g., Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535 (1959) ;
Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363 (1957) ; Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331 (1955).
See generally PRITCHETT, THE POLITICAL OFFENDER AND THE WARREN COURT (1958);
Beaney, Civil Liberties and Statutory Construction, 8 J. Pun. L. 66 (1959).
84 See Note, Congressional Reversal of Supreme Court Decisions: 1945-1957, 71
HARV. L. Rxv. 1324 (1958), where it is shown that, with few exceptions, Congress
appears to correct the Supreme Court on matters of statutory interpretation only on
the infrequent occasions when there is no significant opposition to, or when there are
powerful interest groups behind, the reversal of the Court. Of course, only a very
small percentage of these cases involve statutes whose interpretation raises constitutional considerations; in such cases, one would expect that the difficulties in the way
reversal would be almost insurmountable.
of congressional
85
The Court narrowly
E.g., United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612 (1954).
construed the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act, 60 Stat. 839-42 (1946), 2 U.S.C.
§§ 261-70 (1964), to apply only to those making direct contacts with members of
Congress and rejected the contention that the act was intended to regulate attempts
to influence the passage or defeat of legislation by appeals to the general public. By
adopting this construction, first amendment questions were avoided.
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broad construction would normally render the statute inapplicable in
the case at hand, it would not be necessary for the Court-provided constitutional questions still remain-to express itself on the validity of
any narrower construction, although in a case involving a statute that
had already been upheld, the Court would be under some obligation
to explain why the broader construction would raise constitutional
doubts not settled by the previous decisions.
Thus, to use another example from the area of freedom of expression, Congress, in the Smith Act,86 made it unlawful to teach or
advocate the violent overthrow of the government, and the constitutionality of this provision of the statute was upheld as applied to
members of the Communist Party in Dennis v. United States.87 In
Yates v. United States,"' however, the Court found that the judge's
charge to the jury in a trial of fourteen Communists for conspiracy to
teach and advocate violent overthrow permitted a verdict of guilty even
if the advocacy involved were mere advocacy of overthrow as an abstract doctrine rather than as a call to future action.' The question
that the Court then ostensibly set out to answer was whether Congress,
in enacting the Smith Act, had intended to prohibit the advocacy of
abstract doctrine. The majority concluded that Congress had not, on
the ground that such a prohibition would have entered "a constitutional danger zone," which "we should not assume that Congress chose
to disregard." 90 But inasmuch as the first amendment certainly makes
no explicit distinction between these two types of advocacy, and since
the Court, in Yates, conceded that advocacy of action was constitutionally punishable because of the need of the government to protect
itself,"' the only possible justification for erecting the boundary of the
"constitutional danger zone" somewhere between them would be that
the Court could foresee no real public need for the punishment of mere
doctrinal advocacy that would be sufficient to warrant an abridgment
of speech.
Regardless of the lack of rigor with which the facts were found
by the Court, the constitutional question presented here was one of legislative fact. If the government had been able to present enough facts
to the Court to demonstrate that the public need for suppressing doctrinal advocacy was as great as the need for suppressing advocacy of
action, the same theory that permitted suppression of the latter in the
8654 Stat. 670-71 (1940), as amended, 18 U.S.C. §2385 (1964).
87,341 U.S. 494 (1951).
88 354 U.S. 298 (1957).
8 Id. at 312-18.
90
Id. at 319.
91
Id. at 321.
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face of the absolute language of the first amendment would have required the removal of doctrinal advocacy from the constitutional
danger zone. Conversely, if it could be shown that the public need
for prohibiting advocacy of action was so slight that it could never
warrant an abridgment of the freedom of speech as great as that imposed by the Smith Act, it would follow that the provisions of that
statute prohibiting advocacy of overthrow would be moved into the
danger zone in their entirety, and could be struck down on their face.
One may well understand, however, why the Supreme Court might
hesitate to make a ruling of such finality on this question. It is at
least conceivable that the threat of violent overthrow may become real
at some time in the future, and the Court ought not to be expected to
nullify once and for all a law that might, under those circumstances,
prove essential for the protection of the public.
V. LEGISLATIVE FACTS AND CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONS:
THE CASE OF COMMERCE

The problem faced by challengers and defenders of legislation in
a constitutional case is to be allowed to bring sufficient facts before
the courts to persuade them of the soundness of their contentions, for
when the question of constitutionality is not obvious, "the validity of
the legislation depends on the conclusions reached by the court with
reference to . .

.

question [s] of fact."

92

The sole purpose of the

Brandeis brief filed by Louis Brandeis as counsel for the state of Oregon
in the Muller case,93 and which was successful in persuading a majority
of the Court of the reasonableness of state legislation regulating the
maximum hours of employment of women in industry, was to focus
judicial consciousness on present facts rather than previous precedents.'
And, although the doctrine of freedom of contract that the Brandeis
brief was originally designed to combat has long since been discarded,
the importance of questions of fact in the adjudication of constitutional
claims has not been the least diminished. Thus the Brandeis brief has
not lost its usefulness in constitutional law, for it remains a device by
which a large amount of data can be assembled, organized and presented for judicial consideration in digestable form. Although two
basic difficulties have been seen as arising from the use of the legal
brief for the presentation of constitutionally relevant factual data,
neither seems serious. First, the form of the brief and reply brief is
not always the best means of making data available for accurate ap92 BiklW, Judicial Determination of Questions of Fact Affecting the Constitutional
Validity of Legislative Action, 38 HARv. L. Rnv. 6 (1924).
9
3 Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
94
See MAsoN, BRxDEIs: A FREE MAN'S Lu-s 245-54 (1946).
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praisal by the courts. 5 But the use of the brief surely ought not to
preclude a trial of the legislative facts, if only because fuller examination would be preferable. The important factor is that courts be as
fully apprised as possible of pertinent legislative fact; the ingenuity
of advocates and the stimulation of advocacy may well be able to overcome technical difficulties. Where an adequate trial of the facts is not
held, however, and the appellate courts find it necessary to be more
fully informed on factual questions, a remand to the lower court for a
more thorough trial would be entirely in order.""
Second, and considerably more significant, is Professor Paul
Freund's observation that the Brandeis brief "is designed to support
legislation rather than to undermine it-to vindicate an experiment,
not to veto it." 97 For implicit in the original concept of the brief was
the understanding that it was not necessary to prove the validity of
the conclusions drawn by the legislature from the data it contained,
but simply to show that the legislature had a reasonable basis for arriving at its conclusion-to show that a reasonable relationship existed
between the provisions of the challenged statute and a proper legislative objective.'
Thus any material presented in a reply brief for
the purpose of demonstrating the invalidity of the legislative conclusions would be entirely irrelevant, for once it had been shown that
the legislature had a reasonable basis for its belief, the presumption of
constitutionality would sustain the statute. But this maximum reliance on the presumption of constitutionality would be appropriate
only when the presumption is at its strongest-when the challenge to
the constitutionality of the statute is based solely on a claim that the
law, if federal, is outside the scope of the delegated powers of Congress,
or else that it is not related to a proper public purpose, which was,
incidentally, the primary claim in the liberty of contract cases. 99 When
the presumption is balanced, either partially or completely, by virtue of
the law's potential abridgment of a constitutionally protected right,
factual data tending to undermine the statute by showing that the
95
FREUD, ON UNDERSTANDING THE SUPRFmE CotRT 87-92 (1949) ; Karst, supra
note 60, at 100-03.
96 See, e.g., Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963);
cases cited in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in H. P. Hood &
Sons v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 574 (1949).
97 Freund, supra note 61.
98
MAsoN, op. cit. supra note 94, at 248.
99 Liberty of contract was, of course, in the eyes of the Lochner Court, a right
as firmly protected by the Constitution as any other, and more firmly protected than
rights such as freedom of expression which are now conceded particular importance.
Nevertheless, liberty of contract was admittedly subject to so many limitations in
the public interest that the real argument in these cases was whether the challenged
law bore a relation to a real public purpose, and the constitutionality of the law
hinged solely on that fact, as all three opinions in Lochner bear out. Rights such as
free speech today may be abridged only by the showing of an overriding public purpose.
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abridgment is unnecessary to the accomplishment of the public purpose,
or that it is unjustifiably severe in light of the magnitude of the public
purpose to be served, would become quite relevant. In such cases,
it would not be enough to show that there was a reasonable basis for
the legislative belief in the propriety of the law; it would have to be
shown that there was an adequate basis for the belief that the law,
both as enacted and as applied, was sufficiently necessary in the public
interest to warrant the degree of abridgment of constitutional rights
that it would bring about. And degree of necessity, if not reasonableness of belief, is open to rebuttal by counterdemonstrations of fact in a
Brandeis brief or by testimony at a trial.
There is one area of law in which the presumption of constitutionality is generally conceded to be offset by competing considerations, so that legislative facts may be weighed on the judicial
scales. This is the area of state regulation of interstate commerce,
where, at least since Cooley v. Board of Wardens 100 in 1852, the
applicable, although enigmatic, constitutional rule regarding the extent
of state power has been that states cannot establish regulations governing those aspects of interstate commerce that "are in their nature
national, or admit only of one uniform system, or plan of regulation,"
but can establish regulations to govern any aspect that "is local and
not national," that "is likely to be the best provided for, not by one
system, or plan of regulations, but by as many as the legislative discretion of the several States should deem applicable." 101 The patent
reasonableness of this rule tends to disguise the fact that it leaves open
the very large questions of just which aspects of interstate commerce
require a uniform system of regulation and which do not, and just
how much regulation the states can impose in the areas where some
state regulation is permissible." 2 Although Congress has the undoubted power to provide the authoritative answers to these questions,
it has not chosen to attempt the impossible task of drawing the
boundary lines in all their necessary detail. Thus, if interstate commerce is not to be left to the mercy of state legislatures, it is for the
courts to decide whether state or national concerns are paramount, and
this frankly legislative question should be answered, as it can only be
answered, by thoughtful reference to legislative facts.
10053 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1852).
3o011d. at 319.
102 It is not clear, from the opinions of the Court in cases in this area, whether

the magnitude of the burden placed on commerce, the degree of the need for uniformity, or the importance of the local interest is the controlling factor in determining
the validity of the state law. The three concepts are normally intermingled. See
Stern, The Problems of Yesteryear-Commerce and Due Process, 4 VAND. L. REv.
446, 451-57 (1951).
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Not all the Justices of the Supreme Court have accepted this task
willingly, however. Mr. Justice Black, in the 1945 case of Southern
Pacific Co. v. Arizona,10 3 insisted that this was an area in which
judicial self-restraint must prevail, and he heatedly objected both to
the practice of holding a trial of legislative facts and to the Court's
reliance on the facts found in such a trial to rule that an Arizona law
limiting the lengths of interstate trains did not have sufficient advantages as a safety measure to warrant the interference with interstate commerce that it caused. Trials of legislative facts, he argued,
were entirely improper, for these facts had no relevance to the judicial
process and could be used only to permit the courts to review the
wisdom of the policy embodied in challenged laws, and thus to act as
a "super legislature." 'o Only Congress, he maintained, should be
able to void nondiscriminatory state laws as improper regulations of
interstate commerce, for, of the branches of the federal government,
only Congress could consider legislative facts. 3 But despite the vigor
of Mr. Justice Black's arguments, such stringent limitations on the
judiciary would hardly seem justified, for consideration of legislative
facts has other purposes than a mere review of the wisdom of legislative
policy. When courts try such questions in commerce cases, the crucial
evidentiary facts concern the urgency of the state policy not its wisdom
and, in addition, a factor not necessarily considered at all by the state
legislature, the impact of that policy on national commerce. That is,
the legislative question to be determined by the courts is not whether
the law is a good idea, but whether the urgency of the public need
it was enacted to meet is sufficiently great to warrant the degree of
the obstruction it imposes on interstate commerceY°6 This is altogether
a different question, requiring an altogether different presumption of
constitutionality than would be presented by a claim that the law is
unreasonable, and it demands judicial concentration on legislative facts.
103325 U.S. 761 (1945).
1 4
0 Id. at 788 (dissenting opinion).
105 This was not the first expression by Mr. Justice Black of his belief that courts
could not void legislative acts for legislative considerations. In J. D. Adams Mfg.
Co. v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307, 316 (1938) and Gwin, White & Prince, Inc. v. Henneford, 305 U.S. 434, 442 (1939), he dissented alone from the invalidation of state taxes

as burdens on interstate commerce in the absence of any act of Congress barring their

imposition. In McCarroll v. Dixie Greyhound Lines, Inc., 309 U.S. 176, 183 (1940),
he had been joined in a dissent on the same issue by newly appointed Justices Frankfurter and Douglas. By the time of Southern Pacific, however, he again stood alone
on this question. While Mr. Justice Douglas also dissented, he expressly conceded
that the question of the validity of the challenged law "calls for a close appraisal of the
facts." Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 795-96 (1945) (dissenting opinion).
106 Cf. Mr. Justice Black's concurring opinion in Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v.
United States, 379 U.S. 241, 273 (1964), where he stated: "The choice of policy is
of course within the exclusive power of Congress; but whether particular operations
affect interstate commerce sufficiently to come under the constitutional power of
Congress to regulate them is ultimately a judicial rather than a legislative question,
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Some such considerations as these might have prompted Mr.
Justice Black to modify the rigidity of his position. Just twelve months
0
after Southern Pacific, in Morgan v. Virginia,"'
when the question
before the Court was whether a state law requiring the racial segregation of passengers on interstate busses constituted an undue burden on
interstate commerce, he concurred in the Court's opinion invalidating
the law, explaining that "so long as the Court remains committed
to the 'undue burden on commerce formula,' I must make decisions
under it." "o Thereafter, he grudgingly gave up his most vocal objections to the principle of judicial review in this type of case." 9
and can be settled finally only by this Court." Substitute "the legislature" for "Congress" in this statement, and "the constitutional prohibition against state regulation"
for "the constitutional power of Congress to regulate them," and the statement not
only becomes perfectly applicable to cases of state regulation of interstate commerce,
but represents an answer to Mr. Justice Black's own objections to the Court's approach to Southern Pacific and to other cases in this area.
107328 U.S. 373 (1946).
108Id. at 387. Interestingly, Mr. Justice Burton dissented alone in the Morgan
case, on the ground that there was a "lack of facts and findings essential to demonstrate the existence of such a serious and major burden upon the national interest in
interstate commerce as to outweigh whatever state or local benefits are attributable to
the statute and which would be lost by its invalidation." Id. at 391. His point is,
of course, well taken, in that if the Court is going to make decisions on the basis of
legislative fact, it must insist that all available factual data are put before it, either
in briefs or on the record, and it is remiss in its duties if it does not do so. See Karst,
supra note 60, at 97-98. However, as Professor Karst has noted, "it does seem that
most of the justices feel more confident of their own unaided evaluations of the legislative facts when they are dealing with civil liberties than when the issues are economic
in nature." Id. at 96. Where the members of the Court have decided, as they evidently had in Morgan, that the local interest to be protected by the statute is not
constitutionally defensible, and that the commerce clause is a convenient tool with
which to strike it down, it matters little whether the burden on interstate commerce
is great or small; as long as a reasonable case can be made out that some burden
exists, that showing will suffice. Cf. Bob-Lo Excursion Co. v. Michigan, 333 U.S. 28
(1948), in which the Court upheld a state anti-segregation statute as applied to
passengers on boats from Detroit to a local amusement park in Canada, declaring
that Morgan had not "involved so completely and locally insulated a segment of
foreign or interstate commerce," and that no "national interest or policy . . . could
reasonably be found to be adversely affected by applying Michigan's statute to these
facts or to outweigh her interest in doing so." Id. at 39-40. Despite the fact that
Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U.S. 485 (1878), striking down as a burden on interstate commerce a Reconstruction period statute of Louisiana barring racial segregation of
passengers by interstate carriers, was suddenly endowed with renewed vitality as a
precedent at this time, one can surmise that the Court would have required considerably greater evidence of a burden on commerce before invalidating a state antisegregation statute than a segregation statute. More recent decisions supporting this
surmise include Colorado Anti-Discrimination Comm'n v. Continental Air Lines, Inc.,
327 U.S. 714 (1963), in which the Court distinguished both Morgan and Hall v.
DeCuir, mspra, and declared that a state law forbidding racial discrimination by employers was not an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce when applied to
the hiring of pilots by an interstate airline, and Lassiter v. United States, 371 U.S.
10 (1962), in which the Court, without opinion, affirmed a district court judgment
invalidating a Louisiana law requiring racial segregation in the terminal facilities
maintained by interstate carriers, because, among other reasons, the law served to
"impose an undue burden upon interstate commerce." United States v. Lassiter, 203
F. Supp. 20, 25 (W.D. La. 1962).
109 In the first cases following Morgan invalidating state tax laws on the basis
of the commerce clause, Mr. Justice Black dissented without opinion. Freeman v.
Hewitt, 329 U.S. 249, 259 (1946) ; Joseph v. Carter & Weekes Stevedoring Co., 330
U.S. 422, 434 (1947). He also pursued a similar course in the first case following
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Yet despite Mr. Justice Black's diffidence, the Court has remained
"committed to the 'undue burden on commerce formula,'" at least in
cases dealing with state regulatory legislation enacted under the police
power,"' and its members have, since Morgan, continued to "make decisions under it," "I striking down state or local laws or particular
applications of laws in four principal cases decided with full opinion.
In three of these four, the Court examined whatever legislative facts
were presented in support of and in opposition to the challenged laws
and based its decisions properly on the preponderance of this factual
evidence. Its rulings in these three cases seem entirely sound. In the
fourth, it paid little attention to facts, and its decision glaringly reflected this inadequacy. Brief consideration of these four cases may be
illustrative.
In Toomer v. Witsell," 2 the invalidated laws were so flagrantly
and undeniably discriminatory that detailed scrutiny of legislative facts
was not genuinely warranted. These laws were part of a local commerce war, in which each of the southeastern coastal states had enacted
legislation intended to limit the amount of profit from shrimp fishing
in its ocean waters that could be drawn off to its neighbors. South
Carolina had passed a licensing statute for shrimp boats establishing
a fee of twenty-five dollars for each boat owned by a resident and, with
certain exceptions, a fee of 2,500 dollars for each boat owned by a
nonresident. The state had also imposed the requirement that all
boats fishing in state waters dock at a South Carolina port to unload
and pack their shrimp and obtain a tax stamp before proceeding elsewhere. The reasons halfheartedly advanced by the state as justification
Morgan in which a state regulatory law was held to contravene the commerce clause,
concurring in the judgment of the Court, but declining, without opinion, to associate
himself with that part of the Court's opinion relying on the commerce clause. Toomer
v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 407 (1948). More recently, Mr. Justice Black's usual course

has been to dissent on the merits when a state law is struck down on commerce clause
grounds-in cases involving the invalidation of a state tax law on these grounds, he
will almost invariably join in a dissent written by Mr. Justice Clark. See Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Reily, 373 U.S. 64, 78 (1963); Railway Express
Agency v. Virginia, 347 U.S. 359, 369 (1954) ; Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. O'Connor,
340 U.S. 602, 610 (1951) ; Norton Co. v. Illinois, 340 U.S. 534, 541 (1951). In only
one tax and one regulatory case since Morgan has Mr. Justice Black concurred in a
majority opinion invalidating a state law on commerce clause grounds where no question of conflict with federal regulations or laws was involved. The tax case was
Michigan-Wisconsin Pipeline Co. v. Calvert, 347 U.S. 157 (1954) (per Clark, J.).
The regulation case was Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959).
Both decisions were without dissent.
110 See Barrett, "Substance" vs. "Form" in the Application of the Commerce
Clause to State Taxation, 101 U. PA. L. Rxv. 740 (1953), where it is observed that
the Court apparently felt incapable of extending the technique of the Southern Pacific
case to the area of state taxation of interstate commerce, and reverted, unhappily and
unnecessarily in Professor Barrett's view, to formal tests which did not take into
account the actual local or national interests involved or the extent of their involvement.
111 See generally Dunham, Congress, the States and Commerce, 8 J. PuB. L. 47

(1959) ; Stern, supra note 102.
112 334 U.S. 385 (1948).
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for its statutes were manifestly devoid of merit," 8 and the state placed
its greatest reliance on the argument that it had paramount rights of
ownership over its fish and wild game and could thus exercise discretionary power to limit or prohibit shrimp fishing or the shipment
of shrimp out of the state." 4 The Court, noting that a state had no
discretionary power to impose discriminatory restrictions on commercial activity by nonresidents for the sole advantage of its own citizens,
struck down the docking and unloading statute on the basis of the
commerce clause."' While the Court might have invalidated the
license fee statute on the same ground, a course that Justices Frankfurter and Jackson urged,"' it relied for this purpose "' on the
"privileges and immunities" clause of article IV, a judgment which
required consideration of the identical legislative facts in an identical
manner as a ruling under the commerce clause.
In Dean Milk Co. v. Madison,"8 a Madison, Wisconsin, ordinance
was challenged which prohibited the sale of milk in that city as
pasteurized milk unless the pasteurization had taken place within five
miles of the center of town. Although the ordinance had the effect
of excluding from the Madison market the milk pasteurized by the
Dean Milk Company in its plants in northern Illinois, it was justified
as a health measure intended to protect the citizens of Madison from
impure or unsanitary milk pasteurized outside the normal travelling
range of the city's health inspectors. The Court is understandably
loath to employ the commerce clause to strike down any law, even
one imposing a considerable restriction on interstate commerce, that
could reasonably be said to be necessary or useful for the protection
of vital state interests, such as safeguarding public health. However,
this ordinance was immediately suspect because it so effectively shielded
the pasteurizing plants around Madison from all outside competition.
Unless the Court was prepared to hold that any law plausibly justifiable
as a health measure was entirely immune from invalidation under the
113 The extraordinary differential in license fees, it was argued, was justified by

a desire to conserve the shrimp by reducing the number of licenses granted, but this
argument was contradicted by the expressed policy of the state more fully to capitalize
on the economic potential of the shrimp industry, and by a marked and uncontrolled
increase in the number of resident owned boats licensed in the preceding years. 334
U.S. at 397 n.28. It was also suggested that the differential might have been justified
by differences in the size of the boats or the methods of fishing employed by nonresidents, or by the cost of enforcing the laws against them. Id. at 398-99. No evidence could be presented, however, to show that any such differences existed or that
the cost of law enforcement was materially greater in the case of nonresidents than
residents.
114 Id. at 399-402, 404-06, relying primarily on McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S.
391 (1876), and Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896).
115 334 U.S. at 404-06.
116 Id. at 407-09 (concurring opinion).
117 Id. at 395-403.
I18 340 U.S. 349 (1951).
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commerce clause," 9 it had no alternative except to compare the degree
of the burden imposed on commerce with the danger to public health
that might have been anticipated in the absence of the law. After
studying the factual evidence, the Court found that the complete exclusion of Illinois milk from Madison served no valid purpose because
of the ready availability of equally satisfactory and workable alternatives that would adequately guarantee the purity of the milk without
this exclusion. 2 ' Therefore, it held the ordinance to be unconstitutional as an unnecessary restriction on interstate commerce.
Mr. Justice Black, joined by Justices Douglas and Minton, dissented, arguing that the Court should not elevate "the right to traffic
in commerce for profit above the power of the people to guard the
purity of their daily diet of milk," and noting that the company could
have sold its milk in Madison simply by sending it to an approved
plant for pasteurization.'
The company's task was not that easy,
however, inasmuch as another ordinance, not directly involved in this
decision, effectively prohibited the sale in Madison of all milk produced
more than twenty-five miles from the city. The pasteurization ordinance, of course, could not be rendered unconstitutional because of the
effect of the other law, but the existence of the second law provided
evidence that the real purpose of the city's milk laws was less a concern
for health than a desire to preserve a monopoly for local farmers and
distributors.
The 1959 case of Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc. 2 ' tested the
validity of an Illinois requirement that all trucks operating on the highways of the state be equipped with specially designed contour mudguards to prevent splattering that might obscure the vision of the
drivers of passing or following vehicles. Interference with interstate
commerce resulted because almost all other states permitted the use of
conventional mudflaps for this purpose, and the state of Arkansas, to
complicate matters, apparently required use of the conventional equipment. Since the constitutional issue turned on highly technical questions of safety engineering, the trial court (a three judge federal district
119 Mr. Justice Clark, speaking for the Court, noted that the contention "that the
ordinance is valid simply because it professes to be a health measure, would mean that
the Commerce Clause of itself imposes no limitations on state action other than those
laid down by the Due Process Clause, save for the rare instance where a state artlessly discloses an avowed purpose to discriminate against interstate goods." Id.

at 354.

120 Madison could charge the cost of sending its inspectors to outlying areas to
the inspected companies, or it could accept the reports of inspection prepared by
officials in other areas so long as the inspection standards were as rigorous as those
employed by Madison and the quality of the inspection was reviewed by spot checks

conducted
by the United States Public Health Service.
2
3 1 Id. at 357-59 (dissenting opinion).
122359 U.S. 520 (1959).

Id. at 354-56.
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court) appropriately held an extensive trial of the facts before reaching
its conclusion that the law represented an unnecessary and therefore
unconstitutional burden on commerce. 123 It was found that mudflaps
were just as effective as the contour guards in preventing splattering,
that the contour guards tended to cause the wheels to become overheated thus creating new safety hazards not present when flaps were
used, that the contour equipment had to be welded on, which was a
time-consuming process often leading to serious delays in shipments,
that welding was hazardous when trucks were loaded with explosives
or inflammable material, and that the statute potentially affected even
truck companies that did not use Illinois roads because of the common
practice of "interline" transfers whereby truck trailers would be transferred from one line to another without unloading. On the basis of
this record of factual evidence, the Supreme Court unanimously affirmed
the district court's judgment. 24
The fourth post-Morgan decision in which a state regulatory law
was invalidated on the basis of the commerce clause, H. P. Hood &
Sons v. Du Mond,1 25 was, however, far less satisfactory. The ruling
was altogether unrelated to the prevailing realities, for the Court attempted to decide the constitutional questions presented in that case
without reference to the facts. The circumstances of the case were
these: The Commissioner of Agriculture and Markets of New York
State had denied a license to H. P. Hood and Sons to open a new
plant in eastern New York for receiving milk from local farmers for
shipment to the Boston area. The Commissioner denied the license,
under the authority of applicable state law, on the ground that the
opening of a new plant by Hood, which was already operating two in
the immediate vicinity, would "tend to a destructive competition," and
would also tend to deprive certain markets (such as Troy, New York,
128
where a milk shortage had recently occurred) of their needed supply.
Navajo Freight Lines, Inc. v. Bibb, 159 F. Supp. 385 (S.D. Ill. 1958).
Mr. Justice Douglas, writing the opinion of the Court, denied that the Court's
judgment was based on a resolution of "the much discussed issues of safety presented
in this case," 359 U.S. at 526, and stressed, instead, the conflict between the Illinois
and Arkansas requirements and the inconvenience that this conflict could cause to
interstate truckers, analogizing this to the inconvenience caused by the need to rearrange seating to conform to potentially conflicting state laws on racial segregation
of passengers that was said to be the basis of the ruling in Morgan v. Virginia. 359
U.S. at 526-27. Nevertheless, the convincing evidence that the Illinois law offered
no significant safety advantages and some additional safety hazards must inevitably
have had much to do with the unanimity of the Court's ruling, and Mr. Justice Harlan,
joined by Mr. Justice Stewart, concurred specifically on the ground that: "In view of
the finding of the District Court . . . this heavy burden cannot be justified on the
theory that the Illinois statute is a necessary, appropriate, or helpful local safety
measure." Id. at 530.
125336 U.S. 525 (1949).
1
26Id. at 529. The second reason raises the unanswered question of whether a
state can, for the benefit of its own citizens, restrict the exportation of a resource
123

1 24
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By a vote of five to four, the Court declared the action to be an unconstitutional interference with interstate commerce. The majority
opinion, although written by Mr. Justice Jackson, who, ironically, was
noted in other areas for his insistence upon due cognizance of factual
reality as the basis for judicial decision, 1 27 exuded constitutional absolutism from every paragraph and was marked by a disdainful unconcern for whatever factual justification may have existed for the
denial of the license. As an added irony, the two exceptionally
vigorous dissents filed in this case to criticize the Court for its failure
to examine the facts were written by Justices Black and Frankfurter,
the leading judicial exponents of the two constitutional doctrines which,
when applied, allow no room for the consideration of legislative facts.
For the majority, the case was exceedingly easy. New York, in
order to preserve milk for its own marketing areas and to promote the
economic advantage of distributors operating within the state, had
denied to a distributor shipping milk to Boston the right to do additional business with local farmers. Since this was a barrier to interstate commerce imposed by an individual state for its own advantage,
the very kind the commerce clause was designed to prevent, it was
unconstitutional. The opinion was replete with references to the
dangers to be apprehended from the adoption by states of laws having
the effect of a protective tariff, and of consequent retaliatory measures,
the wisdom of the framers in confiding power over interstate commerce
to the national government and the advantages of free and unrestricted
trade among the states."v At no point, however, did it give any consideration to whether the New York regulation had a discriminatory
or protective effect, except to note that it was here being applied to
the disadvantage of an interstate distributor.
Even the most superficial analysis suffices to demonstrate the
weakness of this reasoning. The constitutionality of stringent reguthat may be in short supply. It has been held to have this power with regard to
wild game, Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896), but not with regard to natural
gas, Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923); West v. Kansas Natural
Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229 (1911).
127 Mr. Justice Jackson's emphasis on facts was particularly noteworthy in the
area of freedom of expression. See, e.g., Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 295 (1951)
(dissenting opinion); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 13 (1949) (dissenting
opinion) ; Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 166 (1943) (concurring opinion).
See also note 40 spra.
128 E.g.:

Our system, fostered by the Commerce Clause, is that every farmer and
every craftsman shall be encouraged to produce by the certainty that he will
have free access to every market in the Nation, that no home embargoes will
withhold his exports, and no foreign state will by customs duties or regulations
exclude them. Likewise, every consumer may look to the free competition
from every producing area in the Nation to protect him from exploitation by
any. Such was the vision of the Founders; such has been the doctrine of this
Court which has given it reality.
336 U.S. at 539.
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lation of the New York dairy industry for the purpose of preventing
destructive competition was convincingly upheld in one of the great
decisions of the New Deal era, Nebbia v. New York," 9 and, if regulation for such purpose is clearly constitutional, the state must have power
to control the number of plants offering to buy milk from farmers. It
therefore could clearly have prevented Hood or any other distributor
from opening a receiving plant to obtain milk for a market within the
state. Since this is the case, why should it be totally barred from
preventing similar destructive competition simply because the distributor in question intended to ship his milk to a neighboring state?
Such a doctrine serves only to nullify essential regulatory power. In
the absence of any evidence that would show that New York was
treating Hood differently from intrastate distributors, or that the
need to control destructive competition did not genuinely exist, or
that the denial of the license would have had a particularly burdensome
effect on interstate commerce, the decision of the Court was unsupportable.' 3 Mr. Justice Black sarcastically noted that the state law
"should not be condemned on the basis of abstract rhetoric about the
'fathers' and the commerce clause," adding, in reference to the Court's
avoidance of the facts, that "a state is still entitled to present its side
of a constitutional controversy." 131 Mr. Justice Frankfurter in his
opinion argued cogently for remand of the case to the state court for
full airing of the relevant facts, listing no less than eleven pertinent
questions that needed to be answered by reference to these facts before
an informed constitutional judgment could be handed down. 3 '
It is not necessary to denigrate the principle of free trade among
the states or to deny that the commerce clause was intended to be the
embodiment of that principle in order to argue that its mere assertion
129 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
130 The precedent the Court placed particular reliance on was Baldwin v. Seelig,
294 U.S. 511 (1935), in which the Supreme Court unanimously declared invalid New
York regulations which prohibited the sale of milk imported from neighboring states
unless the price paid by the distributor was at least equal to the minimum price
established by the state for purchases from local farmers. However, these regulations
were obviously akin to a protective tariff, and did have the effect of discriminating
against out of state farmers whose own state laws might require or permit sales at
lower prices than those authorized by New York. The regulations in Hood were
not comparable.
131 336 U.S. at 560 (dissenting opinion). Although he has not infrequently been
guilty of similar abuses of rhetoric, he was most intolerant of that technique here,
objecting strenuously to the fact that "appeals can be made to the 'fundamental principles of liberty and justice' which our 'fathers' wished to preserve," or that "reference can appropriately be made to the far-seeing wisdom of the 'fathers,'" and
concluded: "Such arguments have strong emotional appeals and when skillfully utilized
they sometimes obscure the vision." Id. at 563. One wonders whether stirring
language regarding the "fathers" and the first amendment should prevent the government from presenting its side of the controversy in a free speech case.
32 Id. at 573-74.
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is not enough to decide a commerce clause case. The police power of
a state, validly exercised to protect the welfare of its citizens, may
impose serious restrictions on the free flow of trade without necessarily
running afoul of the commerce clause, and the Court must have evidence
before it can rule whether a particular exercise of this power is constitutionally impermissible. The most recent cases in which the
Supreme Court has invalidated state laws on the basis of the commerce
clause demonstrate rather clearly that when the legislative facts are
subjected to judicial scrutiny, an entirely defensible judgment can be
made as to whether the challenged law should be upheld as a proper
police regulation or whether it must yield to the principle that states
may not erect barriers to interstate commerce. However, when legislative facts are not considered-either for the reasons of judicial selfrestraint urged by Mr. Justice Black in Southern Pacific or for the
reasons of constitutional absolutism underlying Mr. Justice Jackson's
majority opinion in Hood-the soundness of the ultimate decision
becomes little more than a matter of luck, and, depending on which set
of reasons the Court accepts, either freedom of interstate trade or state
police power stands in danger of being needlessly undermined.
CONCLUSION

Despite the insistence of those who would deny the inescapable
political responsibility of the Supreme Court, it is not only manifestly
feasible for the Court to examine legislative facts, but such an examination is often altogether indispensable to sound constitutional adjudication. The legitimacy of the practice has been recognized in one
area-state regulation of commerce-because the attenuation of the
presumption of constitutionality is conceded, a factor which removes
these cases from the category of challenges to legislation based merely
on claims of want of legislative power or the absence of a valid public
purpose. But it is difficult to see why the same reasoning which requires the counterbalancing of the presumption of constitutionality
where freedom from unnecessary state restrictions on commerce is at
stake should not also require the counterbalancing of the presumption
in all other areas in which constitutionally protected rights may
justifiably be said to suffer meaningful abridgment (and this would
include those areas of substantive due process in which the Court is
willing to elevate the threatened liberty-travel, privacy, etc.-to the
level of a protected right).
Once it is conceded that the presumption of constitutionality may
be weakened to the extent that it cannot, of itself, resolve constitutional issues, the rationale supporting judicial self-restraint, which is
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dependent upon the existence of the presumption, collapses. However,
if the doctrine of self-restraint is to be replaced by that of constitutional
absolutism, no material improvement could be anticipated. There is
no greater advantage in sacrificing necessary governmental power to
act in the public interest in order to obey the literal words of a constitutional provision read as an absolute, than there is in sacrificing the
guarantees of the Constitution in order to extend judicial deference to
legislative authority. The great task of the Constitution is to grant
government the power necessary to carry out its essential functions
without permitting it to abridge guaranteed rights. The great task of
the interpreters of the Constitution is to construe its provisions so
as to preserve, as fully as possible, both public power and private
rights. Judges cannot perform this task if they uncritically yield either
to legislative assertions of need regardless of the private rights
affected, or to claims of constitutional protection regardless of the
public need involved. Attention to facts alone can permit them to
accomplish their function, and the appealingly misleading slogans of
both self-restraint and absolutism serve only to stand in the way.

